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COMMODITIES LITIGATION: THE IMPACT OF RICO
Michael S. Sackheim*
Francis J. Leto**
Steven A. Friedman***
INTRODUCTION
The number of private actions commenced against commodities brokers
and other professionals in the futures area has increased dramatically in the
last few years. Although these lawsuits primarily have been based on viola-
tions of the Commodities Exchange Act (CEAct),' the complaints have fre-
quently included allegations that the federal Racketeering Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organization Act (RICO)2 was also violated by the subject defendents.
In invoking the racketeering laws, the plaintiff often seeks to take advantage
of the treble damage provision of RICO.3
This article will analyze the application of the racketeering laws to com-
mon, garden-variety commodities fraud cases. Specifically, this article
addresses those cases where a brokerage firm is sued because of the illegal
acts of its agents. It is the authors' contention that the treble damages pro-
vision of RICO should not be applied to legitimate brokerage firms who
are innocently involved in instances of commodities fraud through the acts
of their agents.
Part I of this article discusses the history and regulation of the futures
markets in the United States. In part II, the evolution of the private cause
of action based on violations of the CEAct is discussed. Part III provides
a discussion of the various approaches the courts have taken in applying
RICO to civil investment fraud actions. Part IV analyzes the application
of the RICO remedies to lawsuits which involve allegations of violations
* Commodities Counsel, Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.; B.A., 1969, Queens College; M.A.,
1972, New School for Social Research; J.D., 1974, Brooklyn Law School; LL.M., 1979, New
York University.
** Law Clerk, Hon. Vincent A. Cirillo, Pennsylania Superior Court.; B.A., 1981, St.
Joseph's University; J.D., 1984, Delaware Law School (Cum Laude).
*** Associate, Parker, McCay, & Criscuolo, P.A., Marlton, N.J.; B.A., 1976, Tulane Univer-
sity; J.D., 1984, Delaware Law School (Cum Laude).
1. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides that:
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section
1962 of this chapter may sue therfore in any appropriate United States district court
and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including
a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
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of anti-fraud provisions of the federal commodities laws. This article con-
cludes with arguments against the application of RICO to innocent com-
modities firms unknowingly involved in commodities fraud through their
agents' illegal acts.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Development of Futures Trading
Commodity futures' and options markets' have been the subject of ever
4. Commodity futures are the intangible rights to a particular commodity at some future
date. In analyzing the nature of futures trading, it has been stated that,
[tlhe forum for futures trading is a Commission-designated contract market where
trading takes place, not in commodities, but in executory contract rights to pur-
chase and sell commodities at a later date. . . . Futures trading does not consist
of sales of a commodity for later delivery. It consists, rather, of formation of con-
tracts for later sale of a commodity.
Clark, Genealogy and Genetics of "Contract of Sale of a Commodity for Future Delivery"
in the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1175, 1175 (1978).
A commodity futures contract has been defined as a contractual agreement "to buy or sell
a fixed amount and grade of a certain commodity on some specified date." CFTC v. Crown
Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 913-14 (S.D.N.Y 1977); accord Leist
v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub norn. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); SEC v. Commodity Options Int'l, Inc., 553
F.2d 628, 629-31 (9th Cir. 1977); CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp.
1149, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); see also Clark, supra, at 1175 n.4 (defines a commodities futures
contract as occurring when "one party agrees to sell and deliver and the other party agrees
to buy and receive a specified quantity of wheat at a specified price in a designated month
in the future"); Sackheim, Parameters of Express Private Rights of Action for Violations of
the Commodity Exchange Act of 1982, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 51, 51 n.2 (1983) (defines a com-
modities futures contract as "[tihe formation of a standardized contractual obligation to pur-
chase or sell a fixed amount and grade of a specified commodity, to be delivered by a designated
date or through a contract market designated as such by the Commodity Futures Trading Com-
mission") [hereinafter cited as Private Rights of Action]; Van Smith, Preventing the Manipula-
ton of Commodity Futures Markets: to Deliver or Not'to Deliver?, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 1569,
1569 n.3 (1981) ("A commodities futures contract is a contract between a buyer and a seller
in which the seller promises to deliver a particular commodity at an established future date").
While the term "commodity futures" is left undefined in the Commodity Exchange Act
(CEAct), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has attempted to define futures
contracts as "[a] firm commitment to deliver or to receive a specified quantity and grade of
a commodity during a designated month with price being determined by public auction among
exchange members." COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, GLOSSARY OF SOME TERMS COM-
MONLY USED IN THE FUTURES TRADING INDUSTRY 13 (1980) [hereinafter cited as GLOSSARY].
Commodity futures must be distinguished from actual commodities. Commodities are tangible,
physical products such as barley, beef, cattle, chickens, cocoa, coffee, copper, corn, currencies,
gold, hogs, lumber, palladium, pork bellies, rye, silver, soybeans, sugar, wheat, and a number
of other products. See T. Russo, REGULATION OF THE COMMODITIES FUTURES AND OPTIONS
MARKETS § 1.01, at 1-4 to 1-5 (1983).
5. An option refers to the contractual obligation to buy or sell either a specified com-
modity or a commodity futures contract within a certain time period at a given price. See
British Am. Commodity Options Corp. v. Bagley, 552 F.2d 482, 484-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 938 (1977); see also CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp.
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increasing federal regulation. 6 Trading of consumable commodities was
introduced in America in the late 1700's, 7 and generally was limited to eggs,
butter, vegetables, and grain traded in cash markets for immediate, or "spot"
delivery.' Spot delivery, however, failed to take into account that when
farmers brought their goods to market, supply sometimes exceeded the market
demand.9 This system gradually gave way to a system of forward
contracting,'" which involved the sale of a commodity on a spot market with
delivery deferred to a future date. Although this innovation protected farmers
from delivering excessive amounts of goods to market, forward contracting
was not without its problems. For example, farmers who bargained for future
delivery of a given quantity of goods assumed the financial risk of events
such as crop failures and shipping disasters."
In response to these continuing problems, during the latter half of the
nineteenth century commodity "futures" trading developed in the United
States. Futures trading involves a contractual obligation to buy or sell a
specified quantity of goods at a specified future date.' 2 In effect,
1149, 1154-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), which discusses the difference between futures contracts and
option contracts. The federal government has defined an option as "a unilateral contract which
gives the buyer the right to buy or sell a specified quantity of a commodity at a specific price
within a specified period of time, regardless of the market price of that commodity." GLOSSARY,
supra note 4, at 19-20.
6. See infra notes 23-76 and accompanying text.
7. S. REP. No. 495, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 4951.
8. S. REP. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 850].
9. As one commentator has noted:
At harvest time, literally tons of grain arrived in the port cities by wagon, barge,
or railroad car. This vast influx inevitably created a glutted market and forced
prices to decline sharply. . . . During the off seasons, on the other hand, available
grains were in very short supply and were widely sought. Prices were inflated, as
commission men and merchants tried to procure the grain that was needed by millers
for production of the flour required by an increasing population.
J. LURIE, THE CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE 1859-1905, THE DYNAMICS OF SELF REGULATION 24
(1979).
10. S. REP. No. 850, supra note 8, at 5-6.
11. Id. at 6.
12. For a discussion of futures contracts, see supra note 4. In analyzing a transaction in-
volving a futures contract, one court explained:
The seller of the contract commits himself to deliver the commodity at a fixed
date in the future, while the buyer commits himself then to accept delivery and
pay the agreed price. . . . Every aspect of the futures contract is standardized except
price. . . . Since price is the only variable, negotiations can readily proceed and
the agreed prices can be speedily disseminated to other traders. Standardization
also makes the contracts fungible. Original sellers and buyers can therefore offset
their positions by acquiring opposite contracts, either paying or gaining any price
differential. . ..
The person who has sold a futures contract, i.e., someone committed to deliver
the commodity in the future, is said to be in a "short" position. Conversely, someone
committed to accept delivery is "long." It is a rare case, however, in which actual
delivery takes place pursuant to a futures contract. Save in these rare instances,
1984]
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[tihe futures market developed in response to the increasing economic need
for centralized pricing and large-scale risk bearing in the agricultural market.
Through the buying and selling of futures contracts, traders were able to
discover the general consensus of what traders believed the price ought
to be in the future, based on existing information. By projecting demand
and price into the future, futures trading provides a means of appraising
supply-and-demand conditions and dealing with price risks over time and
distance. 3
The nineteenth century saw the evolution of futures trading, the develop-
ment of mechanized farming, increased availability of land, and the expan-
sion of transportation and shipping methods. The advent of industrialized
farming resulted in wide-spread grain planting and subsequent harvesting."
Chicago, acting as a nexus for new railroad and shipping routes, saw tons
of grain pass through the city during this time period." Price inflation and
the short and the long must liquidate their positions prior to the close of trading
in the particular futures contract. Although the means by which this is done is
routinely referred to as futures trading, futures contracts are not "traded" in the
normal sense of that word. Rather, they are formed and discharged .... A person
seeking to liquidate his futures position must form an opposite contract for the
same quantity, so that his obligations under the two contracts will offset each other.
Thus, a short who does not intend to deliver the commodity must purchase an
equal number of long contracts; a long must sell an equal number of short con-
tracts. Money is made or lost in the price different [sic] between the original con-
tract and the offsetting transaction. If the price of the future has declined, usually
because of market information indicating a drop in the price of the commodity,
the short will realize a profit; if the futures price has risen, the long will realize
a profit. . . .Futures trading is a zero-sum game. Since money is made from the
change in futures contract prices, and every contract has a long and a short, every
gain can be matched with a corresponding loss.
Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1980) (citations omitted), aff'd sub nom. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
13. S. REP. No. 495, supra note 7, at 2 (footnotes omitted).
14. J. LuiuE, supra note 9, at 23. "From 1873 to 1882, wheat acreage in the United States
rose from 29 million to 41 million, production from 368 to 555 million bushels." Id.
15. Id. at 24. As an example, Table I illustrates the amount of wheat that passed through
Chicago between 1854 and 1864.
TABLE I
CHICAGO WHEAT SHIPMENTS, 1854-64
Bushels Bushels
Year Received Shipped
1854 3,038,955 2,306,925
1855 7,535,097 6,298,155
1856 8,767,760 8,364,420
1857 10,554,761 9,846,052
1858 9,639,614 8,850,257
1859 8,060,766 7,166,696
1860 14,927,083 12,402,197
1861 17,385,002 15,835,953
1862 13,978,116 13,808,898
1863 11,408,161 10,793,295
1864 12,184,977 10,250,026
Id. at 26 (citing CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, YEARBOOK (1910)).
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deflation, the absence of standardized grading, and irresponsible trading 16
led a group of grain merchants to attempt to establish "order in a world
of chaos."' 7 Thus, in 1848, the nation's largest commodity futures exchange,
the Chicago Board of Trade, was formed with standardized rules for the
trading of grain futures. 8
Other boards or exchanges developed under similar circumstances in an
effort to standardize trading.' 9 "[Sitandardized agreements covering specific
quantities of graded agricultural commodities to be delivered during specified
months in the future were bought and sold pursuant to rules developed by
the traders .. ."0 Similarly, terms describing quantity and quality of goods,
time and place of delivery, and method of payment developed.' The only
non-standardized term was price. In essence, price is what made, and presently
makes, the commodity market "go round"-it offers the investor the
opportunity to make a profit or minimize the risk of loss.
22
16. Id. at 24.
17. Stassen, The Commodity Exchange Act in Perspective: A Short and Not-So-Reverent
History of Futures Trading Legislation in the United States, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 825,
826-27 (1982).
18. Id. at 827. Rules eventually developed for all types of agricultural trading.
19. Currently there are 11 contract markets in the United States. They are the New York
Mercantile Exchange, Mid America Commodity Exchange, Chicago Board of Trade, Chicago
Mercantile Exchange, Commodity Exchange, Inc., N.Y., New Orleans Commodity Exchange,
Kansas City Board of Trade, New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange, New York Cotton
Exchange, Citrus Associates, and New York Futures Exchange. T. Russo, supra note 4, at 1-6.
20. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 358 (1982).
21. Id.
22. Generally, there are two types of traders that utilize the futures markets-speculators
and hedgers. A speculator is "one who voluntarily accepts the risks associated with the owner-
ship of a commodity and relies on a price change in the commodity to produce a profit, or
risk premium for his efforts." S. ANGRIST, SENSIBLE SPECULATING IN COMMODITIES 205 (1972).
Historically, however, it has been the speculators who have lost money on their investments.
B. STEWART, AN ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADING IN GRAIN FUTURES (U.S. Dep't of Agric.
Tech. Bull. No. 1001, Oct. 1949). For example, in the years between 1964 and 1975 the volume
of commodity trading increased almost 400%. H.R. REP. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 156
(1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 975]. In 1974, the futures trading volume was at
27.7 million contracts; in 1977, the volume increased to 41.5 million contracts. Over the same
periods, the value of the contracts rose from $571.6 billion to $1.1 trillion. See Rainbolt,
Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 2 n.4 (1977).
The House Report on the 1974 amendments to the CEAct described the role of a speculator
as follows:
The principal role of the speculator in the markets is to take the risks that the
hedger is unwilling to accept. The opportunity for profit makes the speculator will-
ing to take those risks. The activity of speculators is essential to the operation of
a futures market in that the composite bids and offers of large numbers of individuals
tend to broaden a market, thus making possible the execution with minimum price
disturbance of the larger trade hedging orders. By increasing the number of bids
and offers available at any given price level, the speculator usually helps to minimize
price fluctuations rather than to intensify them. Without the trading activity of
the speculative fraternity, the liquidity, so badly needed in futures markets, simply
would not exist. Trading volume would be restricted materially since, without a
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B. Legislation
Increased dissatisfaction with the speculative nature of the trading system
and an awareness of the likelihood of the potential difficulties arising from
the system led to a movement to abolish futures trading.2 3 This effort to
eliminate futures soon gave way to restrictive federal regulation. Early
attempts at regulation sought to impose tax restriction upon certain types
of trading. For example, the Cotton Futures Act of 191724 placed a pro-
hibitive tax upon "each contract of sale of any cotton for future delivery
made at, on, or in any exchange, board of trade, or similar institution or
place of business." 2 A like approach was taken in 1921 with the enactment
of the Futures Trading Act. 26 Again, the legislation attempted to impose
a prohibitive tax upon futures transactions and contract markets." The
Futures Trading Act, however, was declared unconstitutional on the ground
that it exceeded the taxing authority of Congress.28 Congress quickly reacted
host of speculative orders in the trading ring, many larger trade orders at limit
prices would simply go unfilled due to the floor broker's inability to find an equally
large but opposing hedge order at the same price to complete the match.
H.R. REP. No. 975, supra, at 138.
On the other hand, "[tlypically a hedger is engaged in production, distribution, processing
or consumption of the actual commodity or its by[-]products." COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS IN RESPONSE TO SECTION 21 OF THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE
ACT 6 (1981). A hedger utilizes the market "to stabilize his profit structure and reduce his
business risk." CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE, COMMODITY TRADING MANUAL 61 (1982). For example,
the producer of a physical commodity can hedge against price decreases of the commodity
by entering into equivalent short futures contracts that are due in the month he plans to sell
the physical commodity. By assuming a short position in the market, an investor believes the
price of an underlying commodity will decline. Therefore, any losses the producer has by reason
of decline in prices on the cash market will be offset by the profits he or she receives in the
futures contract transactions. See Cargill, Inc. v. Harding, 452 F.2d 1154, 1157-58 (8th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 932 (1972); H.R. REP. No. 975, supra, at 130-34.
23. S. REP. No. 850, supra note 8, at 7. For example, in 1864, Congress banned trading
of gold commodity futures contracts. This statute was later repealed. See Stassen, supra note
17, at 827 n. 13 (citing G. HOFFMAN, FUTURE TRADING UPON ORGANIZED COMMODITY MARKETS
IN THE UNITED STATES 364-65 (1932)). The Anti-Options Bill of 1892, see HOUSE COMM. ON
AGRICULTURE, DEALING IN FICTITIOUS FARM PRODUCTS, H.R. REP. No. 969, 52d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1892), was an unsuccessful attempt to levy a prohibitive tax on certain agricultural futures
contracts.
24. Cotton Futures Act, ch. 313, 39 Stat. 476 (1916).
25. Cotton Futures Act, ch. 313, § 3, 39 Stat. 476, 476 (1916). As the senior author has
previously noted, this "legislation made no distinction between futures and cash forward con-
tracts. Present futures legislation clearly exempts from the definition of a futures contract and
from the jurisdiction of the CFTC 'any sale of any cash commodity for deferred shipment
or delivery.' " See Private Rights of Action, supra note 4, at 55 n.18 (citing CEAct, 7 U.S.C.
§ 2(a)(1)(n) (1982)).
26. The Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 187 (1921).
27. The legislation imposed a prohibitive tax upon commodity futures transactions and com-
modity exchanges such as the Chicago Board of Trade. The Future Trading Act, ch. 86,
§ 4, 42 Stat. 187, 187 (1921).
28. See Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922). Specifically, the Court stated: "The manifest
purpose of the tax is to compel boards of trade to comply with regulations, many of which
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and, "[w]ith cut and paste," 29 the 1921 Futures Trading Act was modified
to become the Grain Futures Act of 1922.30
Authority for the 1922 Act was based upon the congressional power to
regulate interstate commerce. Consequently, the legislation was declared con-
stitutional by the Supreme Court.3 Thus, the groundwork for further federal
regulation was in place.
Commodity exchanges, rather than individual investors, were the target
of the 1922 Act.32 Responsibility for the protection of market participants
was placed upon licensed commodity exchanges33 or "contract markets" as
they were designated by the Act. 4 Responsibility for enforcement of the
Act was placed under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture,33 "but
its regulatory powers were limited and proved inadequate in dealing with
market abuses." 3
6
The weaknesses37 found in the 1922 Act were significantly strengthened
with the passage of the 1936 amendments, 3 which renamed the statute the
Commodity Exchange Act. The amendments extended the Act's coverage
can have no relevancy to the collection of the tax at all .... [Therefore, in actuality, the
tax was a] penalty ... to coerce boards of trade and their members into compliance." Id. at 66.
29. Stassen, supra note 17, at 830.
30. The Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922).
31. See Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923). The Court found:
The Grain Futures Act which is now before us differs from the Future Trading
Act .... [Tihe act only purports to regulate interstate commerce and sales of grain
for future delivery on boards of trade because it finds that, by manipulation, they
have become a constantly recurring burden and obstruction to that commerce.
Id. at 32.
32. Previous legislation placed a tax upon trading transactions. These transactions are normal-
ly carried on by individual investors; therefore, it was the individual that was affected. See, e.g.,
supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
33. The Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 5, 42 Stat. 998, 1000 (1922) (codified at 7 U.S.C.
§ 7 (1970)).
34. Commodity exchanges or boards of trade are designated as a contract market for each
type of futures contract it is authorized to trade. In order to be designated as a contract market,
the governers of the board of the contract market are required, inter alia, to (1) prevent its
members from releasing misleading market information, The Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, § 5(c),
42 Stat. 998, 1000 (1922); and (2) prevent the "manipulation of prices or the cornering of
any grain, by the dealers or operators upon such board," The Grain Futures Act, ch. 369,
§ 5(d), 42 Stat. 998, 1000 (1922). A contract market's failure to meet the prescribed statutory
standards was grounds for revocation by the Secretary of Agriculture who was responsible for
monitoring the exchanges. See Campbell, Trading in Futures Under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 226-33 (1958) (explaining contract markets).
35. The Future Trading Act, ch. 86, 42 Stat. 188 (1921).
36. S. REP. No. 495, supra note 7, at 3.
37. Weaknesses within the 1922 Act were not the only reason for the new legislation. Follow-
ing the Great Depression, President Roosevelt recommended to Congress a comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme to eliminate what he saw as abuses in the nation's securities and commodity
exchanges. These regulations would provide for protection of the public and eliminate
"unnecessary, unwise, and destructive speculation." 78 CONG. REc. 2264 (1934).
38. Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:23
to include additional agricultural commodities." Moreover, the power of the
Secretary of Agriculture to license and regulate contract markets and com-
modity futures brokers, called "future commission merchants" (FCM),40 was
greatly increased;" strict anti-fraud requirements were imposed upon members
of contract markets;" and FCMs and floor brokers were required to register
with the Department of Agriculture. 3
Between 1936 and 1968 several minor amendments extended the coverage
39. The amendment extended coverage to cotton, rice, butter, eggs, and Irish potatoes.
Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 1491. Coverage was gradually further expanded
with various minor amendments. See, e.g., Act of July 26, 1935, ch. 382, § I, 69 Stat. 37
(adding onions to the list of protected commodities).
40. See Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, § 3(b), 49 Stat. 1491, 1491-92. A futures commis-
sion merchant is defined as
individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations, and trusts engaged in soliciting
or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of any commodity for future delivery
on or subject to the rules of any contract market and that, in or in connection
with such solicitation or acceptance of orders, accepts any money, securities, or
property (or extends credit in lieu thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any
trades or contracts that result or may result therefrom.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
41. Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, § 4d, 49 Stat. 1491, 1494.
42. Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, § 4b, 49 Stat. 1491, 1493. The antifraud provision is
essentially the same as it was in 1936. Currently, the provision provides:
It shall be unlawful (I) for any member of a contract market, or for any cor-
respondent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection with any order
to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity in interstate
commerce, made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract market,
for or on behalf of any other person, or (2) for any person, in or in connection
with any order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity
for future delivery, made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any contract
market, for or on behalf of any other person if such contract for future delivery
is or may be used for (a) hedging any transaction in interstate commerce in such
commodity or the products or by[-]products thereof, or (b) determining the price
basis of any transaction in interstate commerce in such commodity, or (c) deliver-
ing any such commodity sold, shipped, or received in interstate commerce for the
fulfillment thereof-
(A) to cheat or defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person;
(B) willfully to make or cause to be made to such other person any false report
or statement thereof, or willfully to enter or cause to be entered for such person
any false record thereof;
(C) willfully to deceive or attempt to deceive such other person by any means
whatsoever in regard to any such order or contract or the disposition or execution
of any such order or contract, or in regard to any act of agency performed with
respect to such order or contract for such person; or
(D) to bucket such order, or to fill such order by offset against the order or
orders of any other person, or willfully and knowingly and without the prior con-
sent of such person to become the buyer in respect to any selling order of such
person, or become the seller in respect to any buying order of such person.
7 U.S.C. § 6(b) (1982).
43. Act of June 15, 1936, ch. 545, §§ 4d, 4e, 49 Stat. 1491, 1494-1495.
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of the Act.4 4 Congress significantly extended the coverage of the Act4 5 in
1968 and in so doing provided additional enforcement authority for the
Secretary.46 It was in 1974, however, that "[tihe most important piece of
futures legislation in fifty years""' was passed by Congress-the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act."' The 1974 CEAct "completed the move
towards stronger federal regulatory authority over the futures industry which
was begun in 1922." 4
Most significantly, the 1974 CEAct established the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)." This independent federal regulatory agency
was vested with powers modeled after the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC)Q . Congress transferred the Department of Agriculture's authority
44. See Johnson, The Parameters of Regulatory Jurisdiction Under the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission Act, 25 DRAKE L. REV. 61, 64 (1975).
45. Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26. Live cattle and pork bellies
were added to the list of regulated commodities. Section 5a(8) required contract markets to
enforce their rules; currently the provision provides that a contract market shall:
Enforce all bylaws, rules, regulations, and resolutions, made or issued by it or
by the governing board thereof or any committee, that (i) have been approved by
the Commission, pursuant to paragraph (12) of this section, (ii) have been effective
under such paragraph, or (iii) must be enforced pursuant to any Commission rule,
regulation, or order; and revoke and not enforce any such bylaw, rule, regulation,
or resolution, made, issued, or proposed by it or by the governing board thereof
or any committee, which has been disapproved by the Commission.
7 U.S.C. § 7a(8) (1982).
46. Section 6a empowered the Secretary of Agriculture to disprove contract market rules
which violated or would have violated the act or regulations. Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L.
90-258, 82 Stat. 26, 30. Section 6b empowered the Secretary to issue cease and desist orders
against contract markets for violations of the Act, which included failure to enforce its own
rules. Act of Feb. 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-258, 82 Stat. 26, 30-31.
47. See Stassen, supra note 17, at 833.
48. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389.
49. See Private Rights of Action, supra note 4, at 59.
50. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 2(a),
88 Stat. 1389, 1389. The CFTC is an independent federal regulatory agency. It is directed by
five commissioners who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of Con-
gress. The CFTC is the successor to the Department of Agriculture's Commodity Exchange
Authority. See generally Rainbolt, Regulating the Grain Gambler and His Successors, 6 HoFsTRA
L. REV. 1 (1977) (CEAct was amended to provide a new, independent regulatory commission);
Note, Abuses in the Commodity Markets: the Need for Change in the Regulatory Structure,
63 GEO. L.J. 75 (1975) (authority criticized for inadequacy of its regulation).
51. See Sackheim, Judicial Equitable Enforcement of the Federal Commodities Laws, 32
AM. U.L. REv. 945 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Enforcement]. There, the senior author
stated:
In congressional hearings on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act
of 1974, Professor Glenn Willet Clark testified that "[a] full-time Futures Exchange
Commission, deliberately patterned in the structure' of the SEC, must be created
if regulation of this growing and vitally important market is to meet today's press-
ing demands." . . . One commentator has noted that "the emphasis [of the hear-
ings] was on filling the regulatory gap by creating a strong regulatory agency com-
parable to the SEC." ...A former vice-chairman of the Commission concluded
that "[tjhe 1974 amendments replaced regulation by the Secretary of Agriculture
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over commodity future trading to the CFTC, which was granted new and
broad enforcement power. 2
In keeping with the trend toward stronger federal regulation over com-
modity trading," the CFTC was granted extensive enforcement powers to
ensure compliance with the CEAct." Among these powers is the CFTC's
authority to invoke its own administrative disciplinary proceedings" whereby
it may suspend or revoke the registration of parties from trading over con-
tract markets, 6 impose civil monetary penalties for violating the CEAct,57
and issue cease and desist orders affecting possible future violative activities."
The CFTC is also authorized to institute equitable injunctive actions in federal
district courts59 to remedy the wrong and to prevent future violations of
with regulation by the CFTC, a five-member, independent regulatory commission,
similar to the SEC.
Id. at 948 n.5 (citations omitted).
52. See CEAct § 6(b), 6(c), 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. See generally Sackheim, Administrative Enforcement of the Federal Commodities Laws
by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 12 SETON HALL L. REV. 445 (1982) (exploring
the aggressive enforcement program the CFTC has engaged in in order to protect the public
from abuses in commodity trading and to ensure the integrity of the markets).
55. 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (1982) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 18(b) (1976)). See generally Rosen,
Reparation Proceedings Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 27 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1978) (discuss-
ing throughout this administrative process).
56. 7 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
57. Id.
58. Id. § 13(b). Section 13(b) provides, in part, that,
the Commission may, upon notice and hearing .... make and enter an order directing
[that any violator of the Act] cease and desist therefrom, and if such person thereafter
. . . shall fail or refuse to obey or comply with such order, such person shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more
than $100,000, or imprisoned for not less than six months nor more than one year,
or both.
Id.
59. Id. § 13a-1. Senator Alan Cranston stated with respect to the passage of the new Act:
The effectiveness of the new Commodity Exchange Commission depends upon
its ability to act swiftly to enforce its regulations. If the Commission was authorized
to go directly into court to seek injunctions rather than notifying the Attorney General
to bring action, unnecessary delays would be avoided and the public would be better
protected against such practices as fraud, manipulation of the market, and mis-
handling of funds.
Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974: Hearings on S. 2485, S. 3827 and H.R.
13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture and Forestry, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 756 (1974).
For examples of such injunctive actions, see CFTC v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1979);
CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
438 U.S. 905 (1978); CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott, Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); CFTC v. United States Metals Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1979);
CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Options, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). During
the 1982 fiscal year, the CFTC filed 17 suits seeking, inter alia, injunctive relief. Permanent
injunctive relief was obtained against 80 individuals and firms. 1982 CFTC ANN. REP. 38 (1983).
The court may issue temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions pursuant to
§ 6c of the CEAct. 7 U.S.C. § 13a-I (1982); see, e.g., CFTC v. Trending Cycles for Com-
modities, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,013 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 17, 1980).
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the CEAct. 6"
The 1974 legislation also sought to protect individual investors through
the imposition of two new remedial measures. Section 5a(l 1) provided for
the resolution of customer grievances through arbitration procedures. 6 Sec-
tion 14 authorized the CFTC to grant reparations62 to any individual "com-
plaining of any violation of the CEA, or its implementing regulations, com-
mitted by any futures commission merchant or any associate thereof, floor
broker, commodity trading advisor, or commodity pool operation."' 3
In 1978, Congress passed its first "sunset"'" review 6 of the CFTC, which
"emerg[ed] intact with a fine-tuning, but not an overhauling, of its powers. 66
The primary effect 1 of the new legislation was to settle the "jurisdictional
battle"' 8 over certain financial instruments that arose between the CFTC
and SEC. 69 "Congress found sunset review such a wholesome experience that
it slated a new sunset for 1982."1
Almost eight full years after its creation, the CFTC and the CEAct under-
went a "comprehensive" 7' review by Congress. This review resulted in the
Futures Trading Act of 1982.72 Among other things, the 1982 Act
strengthened the CFTC's enforcement authority, 3 redefined the jurisdiction
60. Judicial Enforcement, supra note 51, at 950; see also Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,
703 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("lain injunction is a drastic remedy, not a mild
prophylactic").
61. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(l1) (1982).
62. Id. § 18. For regulations concerning the conduct of reparations proceedings before
the CFTC, see 17 C.F.R. §§ 12.1-102 (1983).
63. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 366 (1982).
64. Currently there are five other federal agencies subject to sunset review. See Young,
A Test of Federal Sunset: Congressional Reauthorization of the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, 27 EMORY L.J. 853, 859 n.29 (1978). The term "sunset" generally refers to the
"statutory method of forcing a legislature to make a periodic determination whether to allow
a particular program or agency to continue." Id. at 854. See generally Adams, Sunset: A Pro-
posal for Accountable Government, 28 AD. L. REV. 511 (1976) (discussing the sunset review
mechanism).
65. See S. REP. No. 850, supra note 8, at 13; H.R. REP. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
11 (1978). See generally Gaine, 1978 Sunset Review of the CFTC: Analysis and Comment,
34 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 290 (1979); Schneider & Santo, Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion: A Review of the 1978 Legislation, 34 Bus. LAW. 1755 (1979) (both sources discussing
the 1978 legislation).
66. Private Rights of Action, supra note 4, at 62. One author has concluded that "in 1978,
the fledgling CFTC was still in its infancy, and Congress made no major substantive changes
in the tapestry of commodities regulation." Rosen, The Impact of the Futures Trading Act
of 1982 on Commodity Regulation, 15 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 142, 142 (1983).
67. There were other effects of the 1978 legislation. For example, the sale of options was
banned, except options sold by dealers in the trade. 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c) (Supp. 11 1978), amended
by 7 U.S.C. § 6c(c) (1982).
68. See Stassen, supra note 17, at 834.
69. For a discussion of the jurisdictional battle, see I.P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULA-
TION 40-45 (1982).
70. See Stassen, supra note 17, at 835 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (Supp. 11 1978)).
71. 128 CONG. REc. S14814 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1982) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston).
72. Futures Trading Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (1983).
73. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 12a(9) (1982) (exempting the CFTC's exercise of its emergency
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of the CEAct,74 and created additional categories of offenses." The effect
of the legislation has not yet been fully felt, but one commentator has opined
that "the Futures Trading Act of 1982 sets out a full-fledged regulatory
agenda that may alter the course of commodities regulation.'"'
I1. THE PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION
The evolution of the CEAct also brought attempts by litigants to initiate
private rights of action based on the CEAct. Implied private causes of action
were allowed by the courts. Soon after, an amendment to the CEAct was
added which expressly allowed for a cause of action.
A. The Implied Cause of Action
Prior to 1975," 7 implying a private cause of action for damages under
the provisions of a federal statute was governed by the principles set forth
by the United States Supreme Court in Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rigsby." Under the Rigsby approach, the violation of a statute which "results
powers from judicial review except where such action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"); id. § 13a-I (providing for the issuance
of ex parte orders restraining the spilation of books, records, and assets in CFTC federal court
injunctive actions).
74. See id. § 2 (jurisdictional accord concerning certain financial futures and options); id.
§ 6c (foreign currency options traded over national securities exchanges are not within the jurisdic-
tion of the CEAct). The enactment of this jurisdictional accord was the result of an agreement
reached in 1981 between Chairman Johnson of the CFTC and Chairman Shad of the SEC.
See H.R. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 38-40 (1982) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 565].
75. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (1982) (off-exchange commodity futures contracts made
unlawful); id. § 6(o) (extending the anti-fraud provisions of the CEAct to associated persons
of both commodity pool operators and commodity trading advisors); id. § 13 (criminal sanctions
for the conversion of commodity pool participation monies).
76. Rosen, supra note 66, at 143. One case which has dealt with the 1982 legislation is
Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984). In Lopez, the district
court granted a plaintiff leave to amend her complaint which alleged a violation of § 4b of
the CEAct, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982). In allowing the plaintiff leave to amend, the court noted
that a complaint based on a violation of the CEAct must allege that the commodities firm
"acted with knowledge or in ignorance brought about by willfully or carelessly ignoring the
truth." 591 F. Supp. at 584.
77. In 1975, the Supreme Court set out a new analysis to be followed in implying a private
cause of action for damages. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), which is discussed infra
at notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
78. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). Rigsby allowed a switchman to recover damages under the Federal
Safety Appliance Act of 1903, 45 U.S.C. § 14 (1982). The statute provides only a criminal
penalty for violations. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39.
Prior to Rigsby, the basis for implication of private rights of action can be traced to early
English jurisprudence. See Pitt & Miles, Implied Private Rights of Action Under the Com-
modity Exchange Act and the Federal Securities Laws, in COMMODITIES FUTURES LITIGATION
& REGULATION: NEW DIRECTIONS 139 (1982). Pitt and Miles believe that,
Itlhe notion that private actions might be implied from existing statutes perhaps
stems from the Statute of Westminster. . . . In Sir John Comyns' Digest of the
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in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," should accord the wronged party the right to recover damages
from the "party in default." 9 Following these guidelines, the Supreme Court
frequently implied causes of action under various statutes,8 ° as did the lower
federal courts.
The area of law in which private rights of action are perhaps most often im-
plied is under the Securities Exchange Act (SEC Act).8 From the early 1940's
until the present, courts have freely implied causes of action under the SEC Act8 2
Laws of England, . . . Comyns recited the then standardized English jurisprudence
that: "in every case, where a statute enacts or prohibits a thing for the benefit
of a Person, he shall have a Thing enacted for his Advantage or for the Recompense
of a Wrong done to him contrary to said law."
Id. (citations omitted); see e.g., Couch v. Steel, 3 EL & BL. 402, 411, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193,
1196 (Q.B. 1854).
Early American jurisprudence adopted this view. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dal.) 419 (1793).
79. 241 U.S. at 39. The Court specifically stated:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results
in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied, according
to a doctrine of the common law expressed . . . in these words: "So, in every
case, where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he
shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing enacted for his advantage,
or for the recompense of a wrong done to him contrary to the said law." . . .
This is but an application of the maxim, Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Id. at 39-40 (citation omitted).
80. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (implying a cause
of action under the fourth amendment for damages resulting from unreasonable searches and
seizures by federal agents); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (implying
a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982)); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S.
544 (1969) (implying a cause of action to seek an injunction under § 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (implying a cause
of action by the United States under § 15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 which made
it unlawful to carelessly sink vessels in navigable waters); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (implying a cause of action under § 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act of 1947); Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323
U.S. 210 (1944) (implying a cause of action under the Railway Labor Act); Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (implying a cause of action under the Railway
Labor Act for racial discrimination against employees); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp.,
311 U.S. 282 (1940) (implying a cause of action under § 22(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
81. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982).
82. See, e.g., Blue Chips Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975) (over-
whelming consensus of federal courts acknowledges an implied cause of action under rule lOb-5
for actual purchasers and sellers of securities); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty
Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) ("It is now established that a private right of action is implied
under § 10(b)."); J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a cause of action
under § 14(a) of the Act); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940) (imply-
ing a cause of action under § 22(a) of the 1934 Act); Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th
Cir. 1953) (implying a cause of action under § 10(b) of the Act); Fischman v. Raztheon Mfg.
Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (implying a cause of action under § 18(a) of the Act); Baird
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and statutes administered by the SEC.83 The courts also implied causes of action
under the CEAct. One court noted that "it was scarcely surprising that the courts
that considered the question prior to the 1974 amendments unanimously upheld
the implication of a private cause of action under the CEA. ' '8 '
After 1975, implication of a private right of action was controlled by the
analysis set forth in Cort v. Ash.85 In Cort, the Supreme Court drew from
v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (implying a cause of action under § 6(b) of the 1933 Act),
cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Phillips v. United Corp., [1947 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 90,395 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (implying a cause of action under the proxy rules
of the Act); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (implying
a cause of action under rule lOb-5 of the Act); Geismar v. Bond & Goodwin, Inc., 40 F.
Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (implying a cause of action under § 15 of the 1934 Act, relying
on Deckert).
According to one author, the Supreme Court never rejected a request to imply a cause under
the federal securities laws. See Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris Craft:
A Leaky Ship in Troubled Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 121 (1978).
As stated by one court: "[Tihere can be no doubt that particularly in the closely related
field of violations of statutes administered by the SEC, the implied cause of action was so
much taken for granted that usually the issue was not even raised. ... Leist v. Simplot,
638 F.2d 283, 299 n.15 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). But see Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723 (1975) (limiting implied cause of action under rule l0b-5 to actual purchasers and
sellers of securities).
83. See, e.g., Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.) (implying a cause of action
under the Public Utility Holding Company Act), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); Brown
v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.) (implying a cause of action under the Investment
Company Act), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961).
84. Leist v. Simplot, 638 F.2d 283, 299 (2d Cir. 1980); see Deaktor v. L.D. Schreiber &
Co., 479 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.) (implying a cause of action under §§ 5a(8) and 9(b) of the CEAct),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Chicago Mercantile Exch. v. Deaktor, 414 U.S. 113 (1973)
(per curiam); Booth v. Peavey Co. Commodity Servs., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970) (implying
a cause of action under § 6(d) of the CEAct); Seligson v. New York Produce Exch., 378 F.
Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (implying a cause of action under § 5(d) of the CEAct), aff'd
sub nom. Miller v. New York Produce Exch., 550 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
823 (1977); Arnold v. Bache & Co., 377 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (implying a cause of
action under § 6b of the CEAct); Gould v. Barnes Brokerage Co., 345 F. Supp. 294 (N.D.
Tex. 1972) (implying a cause of action under § 4b of the CEAct); Johnson v. Arthur Espey,
Shearson, Hammill & Co., 341 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (implying a cause of action under
§ 4b of the CEAct); McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338 (E.D. La. 1972) (implying
a cause of action under § 4b of the CEAct), aff'd, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); United Egg
Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 311 F. Supp. 1375 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (implying a cause of action
under § 9(b) of the CEAct); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal.
1968) (implying a cause of action under the CEAct), modified, 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970);
Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 447 (N.D. 111. 1967) ("There is no indication
in the Commodity Exchange Act that Congress intended not to allow private persons injured
by violations access to the federal courts."). But see Rosee v. Board of Trade, 311 F.2d 524
(7th Cir. 1963) (considering, but rejecting, the existence of an implied right of action under
§§ 1-17 of the CEAct).
85. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). In Cort, the plaintiff was a stockholder of the Bethlehem Steel
Corporation. The plaintiff brought a private action for damages, based on the Federal Election
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sixty years of prior case law to establish a four part test 6 to determine
whether an implied cause of action exists under a silent statute:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the plaintiff
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"-
... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit,
either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it consistent
with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy
for the plaintiff? And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally
relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on
federal law?87
The passage of the 1974 amendments to the CEAct88 resulted in a split
among the federal courts regarding the continued existence of a private cause
of action.8 9 In the years following the Cort decision, the Supreme Court
Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), against the chairman of the board of Bethlehem Steel
for political advertisements paid for by the corporation. The Act provided only for a criminal
penalty for unauthorized contributions by corporations to political campaigns. After applying
the test there established, the Court held that a private right of action did not exist. 422 U.S.
at 83.
86. See Comment, Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.: The Continued
Validity of an Implied Private Right of Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 22 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 579 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Continued Validity]. In that Com-
ment, the author states:
The Court amalgamated the class to be benefitted doctrine of Texas & Pac. R.R.
v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the legislative intent requirements of National R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers (Amtrak), 414 U.S. 453 (1974),
the consistency with legislative purpose standard of J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426 (1964), and the traditional area of state law limitation of Wheeldin v.
Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963) ...
Comment, Continued Validity, supra, at 588 n.72.
87. 422 U.S. at 78 (citations omitted). For examples of the application of the Cort test,
see Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), and Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977). For an analysis of the Supreme Court's application of Cort to the Chris-
Craft case, see Pitt, supra note 82.
88. See supra notes 47-63 and accompanying text.
89. For cases implying a cause of action under the CEAct, see, e.g., Leist v. Simplot, 638
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd sub nom. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353 (1982); Ames v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 567 F.2d 1174
(2d Cir. 1977); Witzel v. Chartered Sys. Corp. of N.Y., Ltd., 490 F. Supp. 343 (D. Minn.
1980); Grayson v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 48 U.S.L.W. 2807 (D.D.C. May 23, 1980);
Navigator Group Funds v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Alken v. Lerner, 485 F. Supp. 871 (D.N.J. 1980); Smith v. Groover, 468 F. Supp. 105 (N.D.
I1. 1979); R.J. Hereley & Son v. Stotler & Co., 466 F. Supp. 345 (N.D. 111. 1979); Jones
v. B.C. Christopher & Co, 466 F. Supp. 213 (D. Kan. 1979); Poplar Grove Planting & Ref.
Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. La. 1979); Hofmayer v. Dean Witter
& Co., 459 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Cal. 1978); Gravois v. Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc.,
[1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,706 (E.D. La. Nov. 9, 1978);
Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French, 425 F. Supp. 1231 (D.D.C. 1977); Milani v. ContiCom-
modity Serv., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1976); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Lewis, 410
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seemed to be "pulling in the reins" when implying a cause of action." With
the 1974 amendments, Congress added two new remedial measures designed
to protect individual traders,9 ' but remained significantly silent with respect
to private causes of action for violation of the CEAct. Many defendants
argued that these developments "eradicated any pre-existing implied right
of action." 92 It was not until 1982 that the Supreme Court finally put the
issue to rest in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran."
The plaintiffs in Curran alleged, inter alia, violations of the 1974 CEAct
by the New York Mercantile Exchange and certain commodities brokers.94
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, explained that under the pre-1974
amendments to the CEAct, "the federal courts routinely and consistently
had recognized an implied private cause of action on behalf of plaintiffs
seeking to enforce and to collect damages for violation of provisions of the
CEA." 95 Thus, the issue as framed by the Court was whether, with the
passage of the CEAct in 1974, Congress intended to eliminate the remedy
that had been previously available.9
The Court began its inquiry with a rather detailed examination of the
history of the CEAct." As the majority concluded, "[tihe key to [the resolu-
tion of] these cases is our understanding of the intent of Congress in 1974
when it comprehensively reexamined and strengthened the federal regulation
of futures trading." 9 Presuming that Congress was aware of the judicial
interpretations of the statute,99 and noting that the CEAct left certain anti-
fraud provisions of the original 1936 Act intact,' 0 the Court held that Con-
gress intended to preserve private rights of action for damages under those
F. Supp. 416 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
For cases refusing to imply a cause of action under the CEAct, see, e.g., Stone v. Saxon
& Windsor Group, Ltd., 485 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Fischer v. Rosenthal & Co.,
481 F. Supp. 53 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Liang v. Hunt, 477 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Ill. 1979); National
Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exch., 470 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Alkan
v. Rosenthal & Co., [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] CoMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 20,797 (S.D.
Ohio Feb. 28, 1979); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311 (S.D.
Ohio 1979); Bartels v. International Commodities Corp., 435 F. Supp. 865 (D. Conn. 1977);
Consolo v. Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
90. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Reddington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S.
677 (1979).
91. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
92. See Pitt & Miles, supra note 78, at 206.
93. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). This decision is analyzed in Leeker & Moylan, Private Rights of
Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act-The Supreme Court Decides, 16 J. MAR. L.
REV. 307 (1983); Comment, Implied Causes of Action, 96 HARV. L. REv. 236 (1982); Note,
Implied Private Right of Action Under the Commodity Exchange Act: Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner, Smith, Inc. V. Curran, 36 Sw. L.J. 1055 (1982).
94. 456 U.S. at 367-74.
95. Id. at 379.
96. Id. at 374.
97. Id. at 357-67.
98. Id. at 378.
99. Id. at 381-82 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
100. 456 U.S. at 365-66.
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sections of the CEAct.'0 ' Moreover, the majority found that investors involved
in futures speculation were of a class of persons for whose especial benefit
the CEAct had been enacted and, therefore, had standing to commence an
action. I "
B. The Express Cause of Action
In partial response to the Curran decision," 3 an express cause of action
was created in the 1982 amendments in section 235, codified as section 22
of the CEAct (section 22).104 Under certain specified conditions, section 22
expressly provides for a private cause of action by individual investors0 5
for alleged violations of any provisions of the CEAct or the rules and regula-
tions promulgated thereunder.' Prior to its enactment in 1982, some felt
that a provision such as section 22 would be beneficial to the futures
101. Id. at 387-88.
102. Id. at 388-94. Speculators were not the only protected persons. "[A]II purchasers or
sellers of futures contracts-whether they be pure speculators or hedgers-necessarily are pro-
tected" by the antifraud provisions of the federal commodities laws. Id. at 389.
103. See H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 74, at 239-40 (statement of Rep. Glickman) ("The
Act is currently silent on whether such a right exists; however, the Supreme Court recently
ruled that the Act implicitly provides such a right.").
104. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982) [hereinafter cited as § 22 of the CEAct). For a discussion of
this amendment, see Private Rights-of Action, supra note 4, at 71-79.
105. The legislative history indicates that the remedies available under § 22 are limited to
actual market participants "to avoid suits for speculative damages to assets that are affected
by fluctuations in prices on the commodity market but which are not the subject of transac-
tions on such market." H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 74, at 57.
106. Section 22 of the CEAct provides:
(a)(l) Any person (other than a contract market, clearing organization of a con-
tract market, licensed board of trade, or registered futures association) who violates
this chapter or who willfully aids, abets, counsels, induces, or procures the com-
mission of a violation of this chapter shall be liable for actual damages resulting
from one or more of the transactions referred to in clauses (A) through (D) of
this paragraph and caused by such violation to any other person-
(A) who received trading advice from such person for a fee;
(B) who made through such person any contract of sale of any commodity
for future delivery (or option on such contract or any commodity); or who
deposited with or paid to such person money, securities, or property (or incurred
debt in lieu thereof) in connection with any order to make such contract;
(C) who purchased from or sold to such person or placed through such per-
son an order for the purchase or sale of-
(i) an option subject to section 6c of this title (other than an option purchased
or sold on a contract market or other board of trade);
(ii) a contract subject to section 23 of this title; or
(iii) an interest or participation in a commodity pool; or
(D) who purchased or sold a contract referred to in clause (B) hereof if the
violation constitutes a manipulation of the price of any such contract or the
price of the commodity underlying such contract.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the rights of action authorized
by this subsection and by sections 7a(ll), 18, and 21(b)(10) of this title shall be
the exclusive remedies under this chapter available to any person who sustains loss
as a result of any alleged violation of this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall
1984]
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limit or abridge the rights of the parties to agree in advance of a dispute upon
any forum for resolving claims under this section, including arbitration.
(b)(l)(A) A contract market or clearing organization of a contract market that fails
to enforce any bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution that it is required to enforce
by section 7a(8) and section 7a(9) of this title, (B) a licensed board of trade that
fails to enforce any bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution that it is required to enforce
by the Commission, or (C) any contract market, clearing organization of a con-
tract market, or licensed board of trade that in enforcing any such bylaw, rule,
regulation, or resolution violates this chapter or any Commission rule, regulation,
or order, shall be liable for actual damages sustained by a person who engaged
in any transaction on or subject to the rules of such contract market or licensed
board of trade to the extent of such person's actual losses that resulted from such
transaction and were caused by such failure to enforce or enforcement of such
bylaws, rules, regulations, or resolutions.
(2) A registered futures association that fails to enforce any bylaw or rule that
is required under section 21 of this title or in enforcing any such bylaw or rule
violates this chapter or any Commission rule, regulation, or order shall be liable
for actual damages sustained by a person that engaged in any transaction specified
in subsection (a) of this section to the extent of such person's actual losses that
resulted from such transaction and were caused by such failure to enforce or
enforcement of such bylaw or rule.
(3) Any individual who, in the capacity as an officer, director, governor, com-
mittee member, or employee of a contract market, clearing organization, licensed
board of trade, or a registered futures association willfully aids, abets, counsels,
induces, or procures any failure by any such entity to enforce (or any violation
of the chapter in enforcing) any bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution referred to
in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, shall be liable for actual damages sus-
tained by a person who engaged in any transaction specified in subsection (a) of
this section on, or subject to the rules of, such contract market, licensed board
of trade or, in the case of an officer, director, governor, committee member, or
employee of a registered futures association, any transaction specified in subsection
(a) of this section, in either case to the extent of such person's actual losses that
resulted from such transaction and were caused by such failure or violation.
(4) A person seeking to enforce liability under this section must establish that the
contract market, licensed board of trade, clearing organization, registered futures
association, officer, director, governor, committee member, or employee acted in
bad faith in failing to take action or in taking such action as was taken, and that
such failure or action caused the loss.
(5) The rights of action authorized by this subsection shall be the exclusive remedy
under this chapter available to any person who sustains a loss as a result of (A)
the alleged failure by a contract market, licensed board of trade, clearing organiza-
tion, or registered futures association or by any officer, director, governor, com-
mittee member, or employee to enforce any bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution
referred to in paragraph (1) or (2) of this subsection, or (B) the taking of action
in enforcing any bylaw, rule, regulation, or resolution referred to in this subsection
that is alleged to have violated this chapter, or any Commission rule, regulation,
or order.
(c) The United States district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of actions brought
under this section. Any such action must be brought within two years after the
date the cause of action accrued.
(d) The provisions of this section shall become effective with respect to causes of
action accruing on or after . . . [January 11, 1983]: Provided, That the enactment
of the Futures Trading Act of 1982 shall not affect any right of any parties which
may exist with respect to causes of action accruing prior to such date.
7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
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market.' 7 It is a provision "with which commodity attorneys will have to
become intimately familiar," '. °8 primarily because it is expressly intended to
be the exclusive remedy for the aggrieved customer under the CEAct."'9
Section 22 contains two major substantive divisions. Subsection (a)(l) ' '
provides a private right of action against any person, other than a designated
class of self-regulatory organizations,"' who violates the CEAct. Subsection
(b)(1)'' 2 authorizes private rights of action against contract markets,''3 "clear-
ing house" organizations affiliated with contract markets,"' licensed boards
of trade,'' 5 registered futures associations,'' 6 and certain specified
107. See H.R. REP. No. 565, supra note 74, at 56-57 ("[T]he right of an aggrieved person
to sue a violator of the Act is critical to protecting the public and fundamental to maintaining
the credibility of the futures market."); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.
v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 387 (1982) (Solicitor General argued that a private cause of action
"enhances the enforcement mechanism fostered by Congress over the course of 60 years.").
108. Rosen, supra note 66, at 154.
109. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(2) (1982), which provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the rights of action authorized
by this subsection and by sections 7a(ll), 18, and 21(b)(10) of this title shall be
the exclusive remedies under this chapter available to any person who sustains loss
as a result of any alleged violation of this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall
limit or abridge the rights of the parties to agree in advance of a dispute upon
any forum for resolving under this section, including arbitration.
Id.
110. Id. § 25(a)(1). An aggrieved customer may recover damages in a private suit if he received
trading advice concerning commodity futures transactions for a fee, id. § 25(a)(l)(A); pur-
chases or sells futures or option contracts, id. § 25(a)(l)(B); purchases or sells off exchange
commodity option contracts in violation of § 4 of the CEAct, id. § 25(a)(1)(C)(i); purchases
or sells a leverage contract referred to in § 23 of the CEAct, id. § 25(a)(l)(C)(ii); purchases
or sells an interest in commodity pools, id. § 25(a)(l)(C)(iii); or has been damaged by manipulative
acts or practices, id. § 25(a)(l)(D).
Ill. Id. § 25(a)(2).
112. Id. § 25(b)(1). The failure to enforce bylaws, rules, regulations, and resolutions by the
enumerated organization permits an aggrieved customer, who engaged in the purchase or sale
of conimodity futures or options contracts, to commence a private right of action against the
organization and its affiliated individuals for actual damages. Id. There must be an affirmative
showing of acting in bad faith on the part of the alleged violator. Id. § 25(b)(4); see also
Strobl v. New York Mercantile Exch., 561 F. Supp. 379, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("absent bad
faith, the Exchange may not be held liable for discretionary actions taken pursuant to its duties
under the CEA").
The CFTC was apparently divided over the parameters of such liability. See Private Rights
of Action, supra note 4, at 77 n.164.
113. 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(l)(A) (1982). The Commission's ability to designate a "contract market"
is set out in 7 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
114. Id. § 25(b)(1)(A). A "clearing house" is an organization affiliated with a contract market
which, on a daily basis, reconciles all futures contracts traded over its contract market. The
clearing house guarantees all transactions executed through the contract market. They are jurisdica-
tionally amenable to the CFTC's rule making authority. See, e.g., Board of Trade Clearing
Corp. v. United States, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] Comm. FTrr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,534 (D.D.C.
Jan. 11, 1978), aff'd, No. 78-1263 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
115. 7 U.S.C. § 25(b)(1)(B) (1982).
116. Id. § 25(b)(2).
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individuals. ' 7 Such suits may be brought in federal district court"' and do
not require the allegation of any particular amount in controversy." 9
While the intent of this article is not to further outline the detailed
requirements for maintaining an action under section 22 of the CEAct,'2 °
it is important to take note of the remedies that are available to an aggrieved
plaintiff. Both subsections (a)(l) and (b)(l) provide for a private action seek-
ing actual damages. '2' Accordingly, recognized forms of actual damages, such
as consequential'22 and rescissory' 3 damages, should also be recoverable.
117. See id. § 25(b)(3).
118. See id. § 25(c) ("The United States district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
actions brought under this section."). This same section also provides for a two year statute
of limitations. Id.; see also § 13a-2 (grants states permission to commence civil actions in state
court for violations of the CEAct).
119. Congress has eliminated the jurisdictional amount in controversy as a requirement for
invoking the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts in cases arising under federal
statutes. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982). But see 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1982) (Consumer Product
Safety Act requiring an amount in controversy in excess of $10,000).
Aggrieved customers may also commence their private action as a class action pursuant to
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. The class action has traditionally played a "substantial role . . . in
accomplishing the objectives of the securities laws." Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 903
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). More importantly, the class action affords
plaintiffs with smaller claims a chance to economically litigate similar issues. See, e.g., Vaccariello
v. Financial Partners Brokerage, Ltd., [1982-1984 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. RaP. (CCH)
21,875 (N.D. 111. Aug. 5, 1983); Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 70 F.R.D. 544 (E.D. Pa. 1976). See generally C.A. WRIGHT,
LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS § 72 (4th ed. 1983) (setting forth the requirements for the
maintenance of a class action); Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: Toward a History
of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 866 (1977) (tracing the history of group litigation);
Comment, The Impact of Class Actions on Rule 10b-5, 38 U. Cm. L. Rv. 337 (1971) (examining
the role of the class action in the expansion of liability under SEC rule lOb-5).
120. See, e.g., Horwitz & Markham, Sunset on the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion: Scene I1, 39 Bus. LAW. 67 (1984); Rosen, supra note 66; Private Rights of Action, supra
note 4.
121. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (1982) (violators "shall be liable for actual . . .damages caused
by such violation"); id. § 25(b)(1)(C) (violators "shall be liable for actual damages sustained
by a person ...to the extent of such person's actual losses."). The "actual damages" suf-
fered, presumably, will be based upon the common law out-of-pocket measure. See, e.g.,
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154-55 (1973).
The senior author is also of the opinion that "in private actions commenced under § 22
of the CEAct, plaintiffs should be permitted, if appropriate, to seek ancillary and equitable
relief, pendente lite, to preserve the status quo pending a determination of the ultimate issues
in the action." Private Rights of Action, supra note 4, at 79 n.177.
122. See, e.g., Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 105 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
928 (1969); McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251, 1268-70 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). But see Scharmann v. Republic Advisory Corp., [1982-1984
Transfer Binder] COMM. Fut. L. REP. (CCH) 21,668, at 26,521 (Feb. 16, 1983) (court limited
the damages in a reparation proceeding to actual damages, excluding consequential damages).
123. See, e.g., Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168, 181 (8th Cir. 1982); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Speck
v. lncomco, Inc., [1980-1982 Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 21,047, at 24,134
(June 5, 1980) (reparations proceeding).
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More importantly, however, punitive or exemplary damages 2 are not
expressly recoverable. By the enactment of the new express civil private right
of action for aggrieved futures market participants, Congress has devised
an exclusive remedy for aggreived parties. This remedy is consistent with
the underlying purpose of the CEAct: the development of a unified and
uniform body of law for the preservation of the integrity of the marketplace
and for the protection of the investor. 2
III. TIlE RACKETEERING INFLUENCED AND CORRUPT ORGANIZATION ACT
A. The RICO Legislation
In October 1970, Congress enacted RICO,' 6 and in so doing sought to
combat organized crime's infiltration into legitimate businesses. 127 Congress
recognized that organized crime drains billions of dollars annually from the
American economy.' 28 -Additionally, Congress found that organized criminal
activity weakens the stability of the nation's economic system, harms inno-
cent investors and competing organizations, and interferes with free
competition.'29 Through the enactment of RICO, Congress sought to eradicate
"organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and
by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful
activities of those engaged in organized crime."' 30
124. Black's Law Dictionary defines "exemplary or punitive damages" as follows:
Exemplary damages are damages on an increased scale, awarded to the plaintiff
over and above what will barely compensate him for his property loss, where the
wrong done to him was aggravated by circumstances of violence, oppression, malice,
fraud, or wanton and wicked conduct on the part of the defendant, and are intended
to solace the plaintiff for mental anguish, laceration of his feelings, shame, degrada-
tion, or other aggravations of the original wrong, or else to punish the defendant
for his evil behavior or to make an example of him, for which reason they are
also called "punitive" or "punitory" damages or "vindictive" damages. Unlike
compensatory or actual damages, punitive or exemplary damages are based upon
an entirely different public policy consideration-that of punishing the defendant
or of setting an example for similar wrongdoers, as above noted. In cases in which
it is proved that a defendant has acted willfully, maliciously, or fraudulently, a
plaintiff may be awarded exemplary damages in addition to compensatory or actual
damages. Damages other than compensatory damages which may be awarded against
person [sic] to punish him for outrageous conduct.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 352 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
125. See SENATE COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY, S. REP. No. 850, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2087, 2113.
126. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
127. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess 76-78 (1969).
128. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (Congres-
sional Statement of Findings and Purposes), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1073.
129. The Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 923.
130. Id. For a detailed accounting of RICO's legislative history, see Blakey & Gettings,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Concepts-Criminal and Civil
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An attractive feature of civil RICO is that it affords a plaintiff an oppor-
tunity to recover treble damages and attorney fees, as well as allowing a
plaintiff to bring suit in federal court.' 3 ' Since its enactment, civil RICO
has been experiencing growing pains as the judiciary attempts to delineate
the proper scope of RICO's applicability. As a result, two schools of thought
have emerged. One school favors a literal interpretation of RICO's civil
provision.'32 Due to the broad sweeping langauge employed by Congress,
if a literal reading is given to civil RICO, its application may be far reaching.
A literal interpretation of RICO enables a litigant to sue under RICO and
thus recover treble damages where otherwise one could only recover actual
damages under a different statute or the common law.' 33
The second school of thought includes those courts which seek to curtail
RICO's applicability. These courts seek to limit RICO's application by reading
Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1014-21 (1980). The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the Organized Crime Act (OCCA) states that the "attack [on the subversion of our
economy by organized crime] must begin . . . with the frank recognition that our present laws
are inadequate to remove criminal influences from legitimate endeavor organization." S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76, 78 (1969). The report further states that "the time has
come for a frontal attack on the subversion of our economic system by organized criminals
.... [W]hat is needled] here . . . are new approaches that will deal not only with individuals,
but also with the economic base through which those individuals constitute such a serious threat
to the economic well-being of the nation." Id. at 78-79. Senator Robert Dole of Kansas stated:
"Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act . . . contains a proposal designed to curtail-
and eventually eradicate-the vast expansion of organized crime's economic power." 116 CoNG.
REC. 36,296 (1970); see also id. at 35,319 (remarks of Congressman Roth stating that the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was a necessary step toward the eradication of organized
crime).
131. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982). For the text of the provision granting a private right
of action and damages, see infra note 142. The rationale for such a dramatic consequence
may lie in Congress' attempt to combat organized crime by attacking the economic power base
of organized crime. See supra note 130.
132. See Haroco, Inc. V. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399 (7th Cir.
1984) ("When Congress deliberately chooses to unleash such a broad statute on the nation,
in absence of constitutional provision, complaints must be directed to Congress rather than
to the courts."); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) ("[1It is not
the '[judiciary's] role to reassess the costs and benefits associated with the creation of a dramatically
expansive . . . tool for combating organized crime.' "), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1280 (1984);
Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.) ("The legislature having spoken, it is not
our role to reassess the costs and benefits associated with the creation of a dramatically expan-
sive, and perhaps insufficiently discriminate, tool for combating organized crime."), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Congress intentionally declined to limit the reach of the statute to defen-
dants with connections to organized crime."); see also Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and
Impropriety of Judicial Restriction, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1101, 1120-21 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Note, Civil RICO] (the author argues that a literal interpretation should be given to RICO
and that complaints concerning RICO's scope should be addressed to Congress rather than
to the courts).
133. For example, in security fraud cases, the plaintiff may only recover the consideration
paid plus interest under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1982) (damages cannot
exceed the price at which the security was offered to the public).
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the statutory language in conjunction with RICO's legislative history,"3 or
by reading requirements into the statute based upon the court's interpreta-
tion of the statute's mechanics. ' As will be shown, if a limited reading
is given to civil RICO, its application is more in tune with the goals set
by Congress in drafting RICO. Thus, it may be said that the second school
of thought better represents the congressional intent behind RICO.
Generally, for a plaintiff to invoke RICO, only two pleading requirements
must be satisfied. First, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant, through
the commission of two or more acts (predicate acts)' 36 constituting a pattern
134. See, e.g., Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983) (The treble damage
provision, § 1964(c), "must be interpreted with careful attention to the provision's purposes
and 'avoid a slavish literalism that would escort into federal court through RICO what tradi-
tionally have been civil actions in state courts.' "); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs.,
Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (analysis of legislative history led the court
to hold that a RICO complaint must allege that the defendants are linked with organized crime);
Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (there must
be an injury of that type RICO was intended to prevent); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp.,
526 F. Supp. 736, 748 (N.D. Il. 1981) (where plaintiffs are able to state another cause of
action under federal law, they should not be allowed to use the "drastic and unique remedies
[i.e., treble damages] utilized by Congress in response to a specific and different problem").
135. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982) (the court, in noting
that attention needs to be given to the "complex syntax of the RICO statute," held that the
enterprise element of RICO must have a context economically independent of the fraudulent
scheme of racketeering), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 527 (1983); Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp.
757, 761 (N.D. Cal. 1983) ("RICO requires a 'racketeering enterprise injury:' either the loss
of control over an enterprise due to infiltration by use of two concerted prohibited offenses
.. . or a competitive injury to a legitimate enterprise by that racketeering activity."); Bankers
Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp, 1235, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("[T]he plaintiff's injuries
must derive from the 'pattern of racketeering activity' which violates § 1962 rather than directly
from the underlying acts which combine to constitute that pattern."), aff'd sub nom. Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology,
Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass. 1982) (the treble damage provision of § 1964(c) should
apply only "to business loss from racketeering injury"); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow,
547 F. Supp. 207 (N.D. Ill. 1980).(competitive injury required in order to have standing to
seek treble damages under § 1964(c)).
136. The kind of act the defendant must commit in order to invoke RICO is a "racketeering
act." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) defines a racketeering act as follows:
"Racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under state law and punishable by imprison-
ment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the
following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery),
section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472 and 473 (relating to
counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
indictable under 659 if felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pen-
sion and welfare funds), section 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transac-
tions, section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section
1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503
(relating to obstruction of criminal investigation), section 1511 (relating to the obstruc-
tion of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with
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of racketeering activity," 7 directly or indirectly invests in, 3 or maintains
an interest in,' 3 9 or participates in' ° an enterprise'' whose activities affect
interstate or foreign commerce. Second, by reason of the defendant's actions
commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section
1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954
(relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibi-
tion of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate
transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in con-
traband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to whiteslave traffic), (C) any act which
is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restriction
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzle-
ment from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case
under title II, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, impor-
tation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States; . . .
Id.
137. A pattern of racketeering activity is established when there are two acts of racketeering
activities, referred to as predicate acts, occurring within 10 years of each other, one of which
must have occurred after the effective date of the statute, October 15, 1970. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)
(1982).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) provides in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly
or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning
of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of any enterprise which is engaged
in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase
of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the inten-
tion of controlling or participating in the control of the issurer, or of assisting
another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of
the issurer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his
or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an
unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent
of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do no confer, either in law or
in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1982) provides in full: "It shall be unlawful for any person through
a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or main-
tain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
140. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides in full:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to
conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity of collection of unlawful debt.
Id.
141. An enterprise, under RICO, "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4). The United States Supreme Court has held that enterprises,
as defined in § 1961(4) and used in § 1962(c), refer to both legitimate and illegitimate enter-
prises. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981).
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as set out in the first allegation, the plaintiff must allege an injury to his
or her business or property. 4
2
Much of the uncertainty surrounding RICO's applicabiltiy may be traced
to two interrelated factors. First, RICO's legislative history is replete with
references to organized crime, yet RICO itself is devoid of any mention of
organized crime.' 43 Second, the judiciary is concerned with preventing the
application of allowing RICO's treble damage provision in unintended
circumstances.' 44 As stated by one court:
The potential for an award of treble damages to a RICO plaintiff has
led to concern over the apparent reach of the statute. Read broadly, RICO
would permit every plaintiff alleging at least two of the predicate acts listed
in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 to bring a suit for treble damages. In fact, an
expansive interpretation of the law would create private rights of action
where none existed before.'
Since the categories of predicate acts are so broad,'4 6 it is relatively easy
to state a cause of action in situations possibly unintended by Congress.
Such cases may involve garden-variety investment fraud.' 47 One court has
142. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) provides in full:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of sec-
tion 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district
court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
143. "(RICO] is devoid of any express restrictions limiting the statute's application to orgainzed
crime." Haber v. Kobrin, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,259,
at 96,163 ( S.D.N.Y. June 3, 1983); see also Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp.
1347, 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (organized crime is not mentioned, since it "is not susceptible
to a clear, concise definition"), aff'd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
144. "[O]n the civil side the judicial responses have often reflected an uneasiness with RICO's
possible swallowing up of all common law fraud, a clearly unintended result reached in a clearly
unintended way." Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. II1. 1982).
The Dakis court, in response to the plaintiff's RICO allegation charging the defendant with
"churning" her account, stated that "RICO was intended to address a different malady than
• ..allege[d] ...here. RICO was aimed at marauding bands of criminals, whose ongoing
use of criminal behavior was part of their concerted 'business plan' to control or eliminate
otherwise legitimate commerce." Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
145. Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849-50 (E.D. Va. 1983). For example,
there was no private right of action for violations of the mail fraud statute when RICO was
enacted. The court went on to note that "[it is hard to believe that Congress would create
such a right of action for treble damages without mentioning it in the negotiations surrounding
the Act." Id. at 850.
146. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
147. For example, in garden variety fraud claims, two mailings may constitute a pattern
of racketeering activity under § 1961(5) since mail fraud constitutes a predicate racketeering
act under § 1961(1). Given the broad scope of the mail fraud statute, which requires only
a showing of (1) a scheme to defraud, and (2) use of the mails in furtherance of that scheme,
"two mailings hardly [pose] much of a problem to find even the most pedestrian alleged fraud"
that will allow a RICO claim to be brought. See Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548
F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1982). But see DeMier v. United States, 616 F.2d 366, 369 (8th
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perceptively noted that "[litigators, never at a loss for ingenuity, naturally
found the prospect of treble damages . . . (as well as the possibility of
invoking what might otherwise be unavailable federal jurisidiction) very
inviting for garden-variety fraud claims."" 8 It is this abuse of RICO some
courts are trying to prevent. In buttressing their decisions to limit RICO's
application, courts allude to the existing remedies available to plaintiffs under
federal and state statutes and the common law for garden-variety invest-
ment fraud." 9 One court,"' after reviewing the legislative history of RICO,
stated that "[t]here is simply no hint in the congressional proceedings that
the Act [RICO] was viewed as an alternative, and cumulative, remedy for
private plaintiffs alleging securities fraud."' 5 ' The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has aptly and prophetically observed that if RICO is given
a literal interpretation, "Congress . . . may well have created a runaway
treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious."'5 In an effort
to curb the runaway treble damage bonanza, the judiciary has carved out
six limitations on RICO's applicability. These six limitations have met with
varying degrees of acceptance.
B. Judicial Limitations on the Application of RICO
The judiciary has carved out several significant limitations on the applica-
Cir. 1980) (a scheme to defraud under the mail fraud statutes requires a showing of an intent
to defraud). For a discussion of the application of civil RICO to garden-variety business fraud
cases, see generally Moran, Pleading a Civil RICO Action Under Section 1962(c): Conflicting
Precedent and the Practitioner's Dilemma, 57 TEMP. L.Q. 731 (1984).
148. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
149. See, e.g., Noland v. Gurley, 566 F. Supp. 210, 218 (D. Colo. 1983); see also Harper
v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("While RICO utilized
and sometimes expands upon the offenses designated as racketeering activities, there is no evidence
that it was meant to pre-empt or supplement the remedies already provided by those statutes
which define a predicate RICO offense."); supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
150. Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
151. Id. at 747. In Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007-08 (C.D.
Cal. 1982), the court stated:
Congress could not have intended to provide treble damages causes of action [sic]
to persons whose only injury stems directly from the predicate acts alone. It is
simply incomprehensible that a plaintiff suing under the securities laws would receive
one-third the damages of a plaintiff suing under RICO for the same injury.
In a more recent case, one court stated that "[t]he assertion that Congress would have, without
comment or explanation, altered the [remedies provided in the] statutes . . . which could be
used as predicates to RICO allegations, to provide not only for a private right of action, but
also for treble damages, costs and attorneys fees, strains credibility." Minpeco, S.A. v. Con-
tiCommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (S.D.N.Y 1983). But see Haber v. Kobrin,
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,259, at 96,164 (S.D.N.Y. June
3, 1983):
1 realize that by allowing a private cause of action for treble damages under RICO,
the plaintiffs in this case can effectively circumvent the damage provisions of the
federal securities laws. It is unclear whether Congress intended such a result. Although
both approaches to this complex issue have merit, I find the rationale expressed
in a case allowing a private cause of action] more compelling.
152. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983).
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tion of RICO which have met with varying degrees of acceptance. Some
courts have required plaintiffs to allege in their complaint the defendent's
involvement with organized crime.' These courts require this allegation
although there is no mention of this requirement in the statute. The rationale
underlying these decisions has its basis in the legislative history of RICO
which is replete with reference to organized crime."' Restricting RICO to
actions alleging a link with organized crime, however, has been rejected by
an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions."'
The absence of any reference to organized crime in the statute is due to
mainly practical concerns. When Congressman Biaggi proposed an amend-
ment that would specifically criminalize membership in the Mafia or La Cosa
Nostra,"5 6 it was objected to on the grounds that mere membership in an
organization should not be punished.' 57 Congressman Poff also objected to
the amendment fearing that specifying membership in an organization might
violate the Supreme Court's rulings that struck down statutes which created
status offenses." 8 Furthermore, having to prove the defendant's member-
ship in organized crime would be a difficult burden which might frustrate
RICO's usefulness."' Thus, because Congress enacted RICO without any
153. See, e.g., Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348, 1351
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Wagner v. Bear, Stearns & Co., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 99,032, at 94,913 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1982); Waterman Steamship Corp. v.
Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources
Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109,
113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
154. See supra note 130.
155. See, e.g., Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983); Schacht v.
Brown, 711 F.2d 1342, 1353-54 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Cenco Inc.
v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); Bennett
v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982); In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., [Current Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,537, at 97,117 (W.D. Okla. July 28, 1983); Mauriber
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Haber v. Kobrin,
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rap. (CCH) 99,259, at 96,163 (S.D.N.Y. June
3, 1983); Engl v. Berg, 511 F. Supp. 1146, 1154 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Com-
modities, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 646-47 (N.D. Ill. 1982); United States v. Gibson, 486 F.
Supp. 1230, 1240-41 (S.D. Ohio 1980); see also Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick, Civil RICO in
the Public Interest: "Everybody's Darling, " 19 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 655, 665-88 (1982) (discuss-
ing at length the rejection of the requirement of the link with organized crime under civil RICO);
Note, Civil RICO, supra note 132, at 1106-09 (requirement of link with organized crime mis-
guided); cf. Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 305-06 (1983) (connection with
organized crime frequently rejected by courts in criminal RICO cases).
156. See 116 CONG. REC. 35,343 (1970).
157. Id.
158. In referring to Supreme Court decisions striking down statutes which created status
offenses, Congressman Poff specifically referred to Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)
(status itself may not be the basis for a criminal conviction); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961) (mere membership in an organization does not justify the imposition of criminal
sanctions); and Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (court struck down a state statute
making membership in a criminal gang a punishable offense). 116 CONG. REc. 35,344 (1970).
159. 116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970) (statement of Rep. Poff).
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mention of organized crime,' 60 this method of limiting RICO's application
has been rejected by most courts.
The second judicially imposed limitation on RICO is the requirement of
a criminal conviction of the predicate offenses in order to constitute a pat-
tern of racketeering. At least one court of appeals' 6 and a host of district
courts'62 have repudiated this requirement. The language of RICO does not
condition any civil cause of action upon a previous conviction. Yet, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imprex Co.,'6 3
characterized a RICO violation as a criminal conviction in holding that "there
must be a RICO 'violation,' that is, criminal convictions on the underlying
predicate offenses.""' Thus, this limitation remains, at least in the Second
Circuit, a viable method of limiting RICO.
The third judicially imposed limitation to invoking RICO's treble damages
provision requires that the plaintiff allege a competitive injury. " This com-
petitive injury appears analogous to the competitive injury requirements of
the antitrust laws.'" In fact, those courts which require a competitive injury
160. Congress was effectively precluded from specifying organized crime in the statute.
Therefore, it sought to accomplish its goal of striking a mortal blow against organized crime
by specifying those activities usually engaged in by organized crime. "[The] [diefinition [of
organized crime] was obviously elusive. And to employ the undefined term 'organized crime'
in substantive prohibitions would invite attacks on the legislation .... So the legislative drafts-
man took another approach. They defined 'racketeering activity' . . . to embrace any act indict-
able under a host of federal statutes." Parries v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp.
20, 22 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Thus, "the difficulties of drafting had caused RICO to sweep up far
more than [it was orginally intended to encompass]." Id. at 23. In the House debate, Represen-
tative Mikva stated that his "objection to [the] bill in toto is that whatever its motives to
begin with, we will end up with cases involving all kinds of things not intended to be covered,
and a potpourri of language by which you can parade all kinds of horrible examples of over-
reach." 116 CONG. REC. 35,204 (1970); see also Note, Civil RICO, supra note 132, at 1109
("Congress sought to reach organized criminals by imposing sanctions for the types of activities
in which they generally engage, rather than by directly proscribing the criminal association.").
161. USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 95 n.1 (6th Cir. 1982).
162. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Caton, 540 F. Supp. 673, 675
(N.D. Ind. 1982); Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v.
Heinold, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 645, 647 (N.D. Ill. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty,
513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Farmers Bank v. Bell Mortgage Corp., 452 F. Supp.
1278, 1280 (D. Del. 1978).
163. 741 F.2d 482 (2d Cir. 1984). Sedima is one of a triology of RICO cases recently decided
by the second circuit. Together, these cases place significant limitations on the viability of a
civil RICO claim in the Second Circuit. In addition to Sedima, see Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades,
741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984) (RICO complaint must allege a distinct RICO injury, apart from
that injury required by the essential elements of a RICO violation); Furman v. Cirrito, 741
F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's RICO complaint based on Sedima
and Bankers Trust). But see Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d
384 (7th Cir. 1984) (criticizing the Second Circuit trilogy).
164. 741 F.2d at 503.
165. The term "competitive injury" refers to "any kind of injury resulting from the com-
petitive advantage gained by the RICO violator through resort to illegal business tactics." Note,
Civil RICO, supra note 132, at 1110 n.49.
166. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136-37 (D. Mass.
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allude to the antitrust laws where the treble damage provision allows recovery
only for those injuries which the antitrust laws intended to prevent.' 67 Since
RICO attempts to prevent illegal interference with free competition and its
treble damages provision extends only to persons who suffer an injury to
their businesses or property,' 68 these courts conclude that Congress designed
the provision to protect only those whose businesses are infiltrated and
damaged.' 9 As a result of the competitive injury requirement, it would be
increasingly difficult to provide a damage remedy for the direct'70 victims
of the racketeering activity."'7 Under the competitive injury limitation, treble
damages are available only to plaintiffs, who allege a competitive injury from
the illegitimate advantage derived by the defendant in operating an enter-
prise through racketeering activity.' 72
The competitive injury requirement, however, has been rejected by several
courts of appeals'7 3 and by a number of district courts,' 74 as well as by
commentators.'73 These cases argue that although Congress, in drafting RICO,
1982); Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, 11982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772, at
93,922-23 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982); Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb Rhodes Hornblower &
Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208 (E.D. Mich. 1981); North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547
F. Supp. 207, 210 (N.D. 111. 1980).
167. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977) (treble
damages provisions are available to remedy only an "injury of the type the antitrust laws were
intended to prevent."); infra note 169.
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) which is set out in full supra note 142.
169. See Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass.
1982). Those courts who analogize RICO to the Sherman Act draw support from the fact
that, initially, RICO's goals were sought to be accomplished by an amendment to the Sherman
Act which would have prohibited the investment of or business use of unreported income.
S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). For a good discussion of the legislative history involving
the treble damage provision of RICO and the antitrust laws, see Harper v. New Japan Sec.
Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
170. As the Schacht court stated, "RICO was designed to protect direct, and not just second-
order, victims .... ." Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1342, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 508 (1983).
171. Batista, The Uses and Misuses of RICO in Civil Litigation: A Guide for Plaintiffs and
Defendants, 8 DEL. J. CORP. L. 181, 209-10 (1984).
172. Id.
173. See, e.g., Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1342, 1358,(7th Cir.) ("[T]he erection of a 'com-
petitive' or 'indirect' injury barrier to RICO recovery comports with neither the plain language
nor the central goal of the statute."), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Bennett v. Berg,
685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982) ("We conclude that an allegation of commercial or com-
petitive injury is not required by the RICO Act.").
174. Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983);
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., 11982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 198,742, at 93,738 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982); Hellenic Lines, Inc. v. O'Hearn,
523 F. Supp. 244, 248 (S.D.N.Y 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F. Supp.
645 (N.D. I11. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311, 313-14 (N.D.
Ill. 1979).
175. See, e.g., Blakely & Gettings, supra note 130, at 1040-43; Strafer, Massumi & Skolnick,
supra note 155, at 689-707; Note, Civil RICO, supra note 132, at 1109-14. But see Comment,
Reading the "Enterprise" Element Back into RICO: Sections 1962 and 1964(c), 76 Nw. U.L.
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"borrowed the tools of antitrust law,"' 76 it did not intend to limit RICO
by antitrust concepts such as "competitive injury" or "direct or indirect
injury.""' Two compelling reasons support the conclusion that RICO should
not be viewed as an extension of antitrust law. First, the underlying policies
of the two bodies of law are different. The antitrust laws are primarily aimed
at promoting competition in a free marketplace,' 7' whereas RICO is primarily
concerned with "striking a mortal blow against the property interests of
organized crime.""' 9 Hence, treble damages should be allowed without a need
to show a competitive injury, because the antitrust laws already cover such
injuries. Second, Congress rejected early efforts to draft a RICO-like statute
within the antitrust context. This legislation apparently failed on the ground
that antitrust concepts such as "standing" and "proximate cause" would
create "inappropriate and unnecessary obstacles in the way of persons injured
by organized crime who might seek treble damage recovery.' ' 8
Another judicially imposed limitation on civil RICO is the requirement
that the enterprise be distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity.'8
Under this limitation, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant
was engaged in an enterprise with an independent economic existence apart
from the alleged pattern of racketeering activity.'82 Therefore, the facts used
by the plaintiff to establish the enterprise element of a RICO count must
REV. 100, 125-26 (1981) (competitive injury requirement preferable restriction of RICO)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Reading the "Enterprise"].
176. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982).
177. For example, the Dakis court stated:
We do not concur with the much discredited "antitrust-type" injury requirement
•.. [W]e note that there is frequently great similarity between RICO "competitive-
type" and traditional antitrust injury but, despite the fact that RICO civil remedies
were intentionally patterned after those awarded in antitrust, by § 4 of the Clayton
Act, RICO contains no express requirement that the plaintiff establish any of the
market proof or share anlysis of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts. RICO has
none of the strict macro- or micro-economics requirements of antitrust.
Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 761 (N.D. II1. 1983); see Mauriber v. Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud in
Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 280 (1982).
178. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1982).
179. 116 CONG. REC. 602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska); see supra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text.
180. REPORT OF ANTITRUST SECTION OF THE ABA, reprinted in 115 CONG. REC. 6995 (1969);
see also Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1342, 1357-58 (7th Cir.) (quoting the ABA report), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983). In addition, it also "appeared undesirable to create the possibility
that case law governing RICO actions, which might be heavily weighted in favor of the private
citizen, would be transferred to the antitrust context." Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc.,
545 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
181. See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Anderson,
626 F.2d 1358, 1372 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Barker v. Underwriters
at Lloyd's, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("[Pllaintiffs must also allege
an enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering activity in order to state a claim for
a violation of section 1962(c).").
182. See, e.g., Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982); Barker v. Underwriters
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be distinct and different from the facts used to establish a pattern of
racketeering activity.' 83 This limitation is currently viable in some jurisdic-
tions and consequently represents a significant defense strategy in RICO
litigation.'8 4
The requirement that the enterprise be distinct from the pattern of
racketeering activity, however, is not without its critics. The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has expressly rejected the Eighth Circuit's position
"that the evidence offered to prove the 'enterprise' and 'pattern of racketeer-
ing' must necessarily be distinct."'8 5 In the Second Circuit, the same proof
used to establish the enterprise element may coalesce, in particular cases,
with the proof offered to establish the pattern of racketeering activity
element. 8 6 Thus, in some jurisdictions RICO may be applied where the enter-
prise is, in effect, no more than the sum of the predicate racketeering acts.' 87
The fifth limitation imposed upon RICO's application is the requirement
that the plaintiff "allege that he has suffered a distinct RICO injury as
opposed merely to a direct injury from the underlying predicate acts."' 88
at Lloyds, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983); see also Batista, supra note
171, at 205 (defense represents significant strategy in RICO litigation).
183. Those courts which endorse this limitation and require separate factual proof for the
enterprise element and pattern of racketeering element draw support from the United States
Supreme Court: "The 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering activity'; it is an entity
separate and apart from the pattern of activity in which it engages. The existence of an enter-
prise at all times remains a separate element which must be proved by the Government." United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th
Cir. 1982); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
184. Batista, supra note 171, at 205. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit has endorsed this limitation in Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1060 (8th Cir. 1982).
The Eastern District of Michigan, in the Sixth Circuit, has also endorsed this position. Barker
v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983). But see Moss
v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the defendant's argument
that the enterprise must have an independent economic existence apart from the pattern of
racketeering activity).
185. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 56 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 134 (1983); United States v. Mazzei,
700 F.2d 85, 87-90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983).
186. Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22 (2d Cir. 1983). This line of cases also
draws support from the United States Supreme Court: "[P]roof used to establish these separate
elements [the enterprise and pattern of racketeering elements] may in particular cases coalesce
... " United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); see also United States v. Mazzei,
700 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2124 (1983) (proof of elements may coalesce).
It should be noted that courts which require separate proof for the "enterprise" and "pattern
of racketeering injury" elements also draw their support from Turkette. See supra note 183.
187. See United States v. Bagaric, 706 F.2d 42, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 134
(1983); Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 22-23 (2d Cir. 1983).
188. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Bankers
court, aware of the proliferation of private RICO suits and the judiciary's desire to limit such
suits, stated that "the proper way to restrict the private remedy to its intended scope is by
applying the limitations Congress has itself built into the statute." Id. The court then went
on to find that the plaintiff's injuries must stem from the pattern of racketeering activity which
violates § 1962 rather than from the predicate acts which combine to constitute that pattern.
Id. at 1240-41.
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Under section 1964(c) of the Act, a cause of action arises and inures to
"[any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation
of section 1962."" 9 Therefore, the injury must be more than that associated
with the underlying predicate acts which form the pattern of racketeering
activity. There must be an allegation that the plaintiff suffered a "racketeering
enterprise injury." ,90
One court has recently stated that "although there is some ambiguity in
the case law as to the precise dimensions of civil RICO, the overwhelming
authority is to restrict the broad remedial provisions of RICO to injuries
'by reason of' a violation of § 1962, not merely the damages from two
predicate acts of securities fraud."' 9 The requirement that the injury be
caused "by reason of" a section 1962 violation (a racketeering enterprise
injury) has been labeled by one court as "the most meaningful limitation
which can be imposed on § 1964(c)."' ' 2
Despite this strong support for demanding "something more" than an
injury stemming from the predicate acts, the requirement of a racketeering
enterprise injury has yet to gain across-the-board acceptance by the courts.
Those courts which have not embraced this limitation are unclear as to what
the "something more" is' 9' or what a racketeering enterprise injury
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
190. See Landmark Say. & Loan v. Loeb Rhodes Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206,
209 (E.D. Mich. 1981). The Landmark court defined a racketeering enterprise injury as follows:
"A 'racketeering enterprise injury' might occur, for example, if a civil RICO defendant's ability
to harm the plaintiff is enhanced by the infusion of money from a pattern of racketeering
activity into the enterprise." Id.; see also Spencer Cos. v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,361, at 92,214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981)
(involving the infusion of money into the plaintiff's enterprise).
191. Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 759 (N.D. Cal. 1983); see Schacht v. Brown,
711 F.2d 1343, 1352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Williamette Sav. & Loan
v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1428 (D. Or. 1984) ("Without doubt, RICO
does not just provide an extra, treble damages remedy . . . to a person injured by a 'pattern
of racketeering activity' proscribed by Section 1962, which is separate and distinct from the
constituent, predicate offenses comprising such a pattern."); accord Friedlander v. Nims, 571
F. Supp. 1188, 1194 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235,
1240 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyds, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D.
Mich. 1983); Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007 (C.D. Cal. 1982);
Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass. 1982); Land-
mark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhodes Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 209 (E.D. Mich.
1982). But see Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("The
requirement of 'injury by reason of violation of section 1962' should be read as simply requir-
ing that the plaintiff was injured by at least two acts of racketeering activity."); Mauriber
v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[l1t suffices
for plaintiff to allege injury caused by the predicate acts of securities fraud.").
192. Harper v. New Japan Sec. Int'l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1008 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
193. See, e.g., Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 564 F. Supp. 1347, 1352-53 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Although
the defendants argue that 'something more than an injury stemming from racketeering activity
must be alleged' . . . it has not been made clear either by the defendants or the cases so
requiring it what that 'something more' would be."). But see Williamette Sav. & Loan v. Blake
& Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1430 (D. Or. 1984). The court in stating what a racketeer-
ing enterprise injury is, drew an analogy to Justice Stewart's well-known observation on the
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encompasses. 194 Interestingly, one court has gone so far as to ignore the
express language of the statute and impose its own requirements: "[tihe
requirement of 'injury by reason of violation of section 1962' should be
read as requiring that the plaintiff was injured by at least two acts of
racketeering activity."1'9
If Congress had intended that RICO's treble damages provision compen-
sate injuries caused by racketeering activity, however, it presumably would
have made reference to section 1961(1) of the Act 196 which enumerates the
predicate acts, rather than referring to section 1962. 19' "The fact that the
statute specifically requires a violation of Section 1962 and not just a viola-
tion of two or more predicate acts . . . demonstrates that alleging predicated
acts alone is not sufficient to maintain a civil RICO claim."' 98 Yet, the
statutory language of section 1964(c) in referring to section 1962 is clear.
The plaintiff, in order to invoke the treble damage provision, must allege
and prove that his or her injury was "by reason of a violation of section
1962." In other words, the plaintiff must allege that the injury resulted from
the "defendant's acquisition of an interest in an enterprise or operation of
an enterprise." '' 99
definition of pornography. The Williamette court stated that "[clourts recognize a racketeering
enterprise injury when they see it." Id.
194. See, e.g., Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 494 (E.D. Pa. 1983). The court, after
reviewing the definition of a racketeering type injury as defined in Landmark, concluded that
it "is indistinguishable from a competitive or commercial injury." Id.; see also Austin v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
99,510, at 96,951 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 1983) (court assumed that a racketeering enterprise
injury is an element in a civil RICO claim).
195. Kirschner v. Cable/Tel. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 244 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) is set out in full supra at note 139.
197. See Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772,
at 93,922 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982) The district court stated:
There are at least three reasons for requiring a private RICO plaintiff to allege
something more than an injury from racketeering activity itself. First, § 1964(c)
specifically says 'by reason of section 1962.' If Congress has intended that § 1964
compensate injuries caused by racketeering activity it could have made reference
to § 1961(1) rather than § 1962.
Id.; see also Comment, Reading the "Enterprise," supra note 175, at 128 (A broad reading
of § 1962, which permits recovery absent a direct connection between the injuries sustained
by racketeering activity and a violation of § 1962, "does not comport with the statute as written
by Congress.").
198. Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Va. 1983). The Action Tender
court stated further that, "[tihe Supreme Court opinion in United States v. Turkette, . . .
buttresses this conclusion by making it clear that the enterprise requirement found in Section
1962 must be proven in addition to proving the predicate acts stated in Section 1961." Id.
(citation omitted).
199. Erlbaum v. Erlbaum, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,772, at
93,922 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 1982). The Action Tender court stated that,
RICO requires an injury unique to that Act. There is no evidence that Congress
meant to preempt existing remedies or to provide cumulative remedies for the crimes
listed in Section 1961(1) .... Instead, Congress intended to provide a treble damages
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The sixth and final significant limitation to invoking a RICO claim is the
requirement that the defendant cannot simultaneously be both the enterprise
and the person associated with the enterprise.2"' This limitation has been
gaining widespread acceptance and is predicated on the rationale that allow-
ing the person and the enterprise to be one in the same would lead to the
"absurd result that a 'person' could 'invest in,' 'acquire or maintain . . .
control of,' or be 'employed by or associated with' and 'conduct' itself
(as an 'enterprise') in violation of Section 1962." '2°
remedy to those plaintiffs who could allege and prove an injury resulting from
a pattern of racketeering and corruption-not simply from a predicate act for which
the plaintiff could be fully compensated under federal or state law. Section 1964(c)
compensates plaintiffs suffering from a racketeering injury-not just from a predicate
act . ..
Action Indus. Tender Offer, 574 F. Supp. 846, 852 (E.D. Va. 1983) (citations omitted).
In response to a RICO allegation in a garden-variety securities case involving the "churning"
of an account, one court stated:
Mere negligence or even recklessness by the firms in supervising trading of the plain-
tiff's accounts ... does not allege the essence of an 'independent' conspiratorial
enterprise consisting of [the brokerage house] and [the defendant/broker], based
upon a mutual, and nefarious, gain from [the broker's] illicit activities; it is to
the preceived strength of organized, concerted commission of two predicate offenses
with the intent to corrupt or vanquish a legitimate enterprise that RICO was
addressed.
Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
200. See United States v. Computer Sciences Corp., 689 F.2d 1181, 1190 (4th Cir. 1982)
("We conclude that 'enterprise' was meant to refer to a being different from, not the same
as or part of, the person whose behavior the act was designed to prohibit, and failing, that,
to punish."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1061-62
(8th Cir. 1982); Williamette Say. & Loan v. Blake & Neal Fin. Co., 577 F. Supp. 1415, 1426-27
(D. Or. 1984); Kirschner v. Cable/Tel. Corp., 576 F. Supp. 234, 243 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("The
Court agrees that to the extent that the [defendants] constitute the enterprise they cannot be
liable under section 1962(c) since they cannot be both the enterprise and the persons associated
with the enterprise simultaneously."); Action Indus. Tender Offer, 572 F. Supp. 846, 849 (E.D.
Va. 1983) ("There cannot be an identity between the 'person' and the 'enterprise.' "); In re
Longhorn Sec. Litig., [1983-1984 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,537, at 97,117
(W.D. Okla. July 28, 1983) ("Persuasive authority holds that an entity cannot simultaneously
be both the 'person' and the 'enterprise' under RICO"); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyds,
London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 357 (E.D. Mich. 1983) ("[P]laintiffs must also allege an enterprise
distinct from the defendants in order to state a claim for a violation of section 1962(c)."); Parnes
v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 (N.D. I1. 1983) ("[W]here the RICO 'enter-
prise' has been involved in a 'pattern of racketeering activity' only through the acts of the
'person' engaged in the conduct defined as 'unlawful,' the civil plaintiff can sue only the 'per-
son' and not the 'enterprise' for damages suffered from that 'racketeering activity.' "); accord
Bays v. Hunter Sav. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1982); Van Schaick v. Church
of Scientology, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (D. Mass. 1982). But see United States v. Hartley,
678 F.2d 961, 990 (1lth Cir. 1982) ("[A] corporate defendant may simultaneously be named
in the indictment as the enterprise through which defendants conduct a pattern of racketeer-
ing."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 268-69
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (the defendant may be both the "enterprise" and the "person" simultaneously).
201. In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., [1983-1984 Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99, 537,
at 97,118 (W.D. Okla. July 28, 1983) (emphasis in the original).
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The statutory language of RICO prohibits any person, employed or
associated with an enterprise, from participating in the conduct of such enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 2 Section 1964(c) in turn
allows treble damages and attorney fees to plaintiffs who are injured in their
businesses or property by a violation of section 1962.03 The section 1964(c)
cause of action, which is a suit for the violation of section 1962, must then be
asserted against the violator of section 1962-the "person" who has engaged
in the unlawful conduct. The element, therefore, Which raises the underly-
ing criminal act to a RICO violation is the defendant's interaction with the
enterprise. 4 Thus, RICO "does not hold the enterprise criminally liable,
but only those persons who seek to participate in the affairs of the enter-
prise through a pattern of racketeering activity." 2 5 As one court has noted,
"[ilt would be an obvious distortion to permit suit against the 'enterprise'
that had itself been infiltrated by the 'unlawful' conduct or participation
of the 'person'-the 'enterprise' that may itself be a victim of the racketeer-
ing activity.
2 0 6
Much of the confusion surrounding the issue of whether the person may
simultaneously be the enterprise and the individual defendant stems from
the statutory definition of those terms. RICO defines both person20 7 and
enterprise20 so broadly as to embrace every type of legal entity. Thus, when
read in the abstract, that which falls within the definition of an enterprise
will also fall within the definition of a person. The few courts which hive
held that the person and the enterprise may be one and the same have noted
the expansive definitions of those terms.20 9 In supporting their holdings, these
202. See supra notes 136-37.
203. See supra note 142.
204. Bays v. Hunter Say. Ass'n, 539 F. Supp. 1020, 1024 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
205. Id.
206. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 23-24 (N.D. Il. 1983) (footnote
omitted). In the garden variety commodities or securities case the scenario is as follows: The
broker who has allegedly churned the plaintiff's account is characterized as the "person" engaged
in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through his "pattern of racketeering activity," i.e.,
the multiple churning of the plaintiff's account. The "enterprise" is the brokerage house by
whom the broker was employed. The brokerage house can be characterized as a conduit through
which the broker conducted his churning. Thus, under this scenario, there are, in reality, two
victims: the client whose account was churned along with the brokerage house themselves, who
are victims of an ongoing rule infraction by an employee. In fact, it has been suggested that
in such cases, the brokerage firms, more than the plaintiff-client, may be the proper plaintiffs
of a RICO action against the broker. See Dakis v. Chapman, 574 F. Supp. 757, 760 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
207. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) defines "person" to include "any individual or entity capable
of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."
208. The definition of enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corporation, associa-
tion, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity." Id. § 1961(4).
209. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (11th Cir. 1982) ("A corporation
may be simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise under RICO."); United States v.
Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 268 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (defendant can constitute an enterprise for
the purposes of RICO).
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courts also note that the Supreme Court has broadly construed the enter-
prise element 2" and absent any prohibitions of an entity assuming a dual
role, the entity may indeed assume the dual role.2"' These decisions, however,
have been criticized 2 ' as "result-orientated" 2 '3 and "unconvincing.
21
4
"[T]hese courts' invocation of RICO's liberal interpretation provision .. .
is unavailing. A statute should not be interpreted so as to torture its plain
meaning or to go beyond the intent of the legislature." 2 '5
It is evident that there is an enormous amount of judicial uncertainty sur-
rounding the interpretation and scope of civil RICO. This uncertainty
emanates from the judiciary on the one hand wanting to apply RICO
according to its plain meaning, 2'" and on the other hand wanting to apply
RICO so as to limit the treble damage remedy to prevent its application
in unintended circumstances. 2'By virtue of this dichotomy, the judicial deci-
sions have been anything but consistent. Nevertheless, it seems clear that
a majority of courts, even those embracing a "literal interpretation view,"
are desirous of limiting RICO's application. 2"'
210. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (lth Cir. 1982) (Turkette gave
the term "enterprise" a broad reading); United States v. Benny, 559 F. Supp. 264, 269 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) ("The Supreme Court has broadly construed the 'enterprise' element. ... )
211. See, e.g., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (llth Cir. 1982) ("Considering
the broad reading given the term 'enterprise' in Turkette, the Court's willingness to expand
the scope of RICO's application, and absent any prohibition of [the defendant] assuming a
dual role, . . . [a] corporation may be simultaneously both a defendant and the enterprise
under RICO.").
212. See In re Longhorn Sec. Litig., [1983-1984 Decisions] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,537,
at 97,118 (W.D. Okla. July 28, 1983).
213. The Longhorn court in referring to both Hartley and Benny, as authority to the con-
trary, stated: "It [the Hartley and Benny decisions] is result-oriented in that the courts were
facing defendants (significantly, criminal defendants) who had perpetrated a number of predicate
acts of racketeering activity under RICO and who the courts apparently did not want to 'get
away.' " Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. After noting that the definitions of person and enterprise are so broad as to embrace
every kind of legal entity, another court has stated that:
[W]e may look at the possibility of a strained reverse construction, under whih
[the defendant brokerage house] would be the "person" . .. and [the brokers]
would be the "enterprise." That possibility would turn the English language on
its head. [The brokerage house] after all cannot be said to have "participated ...
in the conduct of [the broker's] affairs ..." as required by Section 1962(c).
Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 24 (N.D. Il. 1983) (footnote omitted).
216. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
218. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1983) (Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit sympathized with the district court's concern about the broad scope
of civil RICO but nevertheless gave RICO a literal interpretation); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d
1343, 1361 (7th Cir.) (Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals noted that although Congress may
have created a "runaway treble damage bonanza for the already excessively litigious," Con-
gress was aware of RICO's implications and, therefore, it was not the court's "role to reassess
the costs and benefits associated with the creation of a dramatically expansive, and perhaps
insufficiently discriminate, tool for combating organized crime.") (emphasis added), cert. denied,
COMMODITIES LITIGATION AND RICO
A careful examination of the limitations sought to be imposed on RICO
reveals that the courts may indeed give RICO a literal interpretation and
yet limit its application. The first limitation of requiring an allegation of
the defendant's involvement with organized crime has been largely discredited
and is generally no longer viable.2"9 Similarly, requiring a criminal convic-
tion of the predicate acts is no longer a formidable limitation22 ° because
it strains logic to read such a requirement into the statute. Although the
third limitation, requiring the plaintiff to allege and prove a competitive
injury, is still a viable limitation in some jurisdictions,2 2" ' the sounder view
is to reject this requirement. "RICO was designed to protect direct," and
not just the indirect victim.222 By requiring a competitive injury, a majority
of the direct victims would be effectively precluded from seeking redress223-a
clearly unintended result.
The limitation requiring that the enterprise be distinct from the pattern
of racketeering activity is also viable in some jurisdictions.2 2 ' According to
the Supreme Court, "[t]he 'enterprise' is not the 'pattern of racketeering
activity'; it is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages. The existence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate
element which must be [proven].""22 Even though the proof in establishing
both elements may coalesce, the enterprise element is proven "by evidence
of an ongoing organization . . . and by evidence that the various associates
function as a continuing unit." '226 In contrast, the pattern of racketeering
activity is proven "by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeer-
ing committed by the participants in the enterprise." '227
The fifth limitation, requiring the plaintiff to be injured by reason of a
section 1962 violation and not merely by a violation of the predicate acts,
seems to be clearly mandated by RICO's express language.22 The Supreme
Court has stated that "[i]f the statutory language is unambiguous, in the
absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language
must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' "229 Indeed, the statutory language
of section 1964(c) is unambiguous, 30 and there is no express legislative intent
104 S. Ct. 508 (1983); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567 F. Supp. 1231, 1239-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (finding itself in "reluctant agreement with the Seventh Circuit's view" in
Schacht).
219. See supra notes 153-60 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 165-80.
222. Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 508 (1983).
223. See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
225. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See supra notes 188-99 and accompanying text.
229. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) (citing Consumer Product Safety
Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)).
230. See supra note 142.
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to the contrary. Furthermore, restricting RICO's application to a racketeer-
ing enterprise injury does not impose an undue hardship on plaintiffs because
they have other remedies at their disposal."'
The final limitation, requiring that the defendant cannot simultaneously
be both the enterprise and the person associated with the enterprise,2 32 also
seems clearly mandated when the statute is give a fair and unstrained
reading. 3  Most of the courts who have considered this issue have so ruled,"3
and it appears that this limitation may be the first to gain across-the-board
acceptance.
Thus, it seems that those courts desiring to give RICO a literal interpreta-
tion may still do so and yet limit RICO's application by "hanging their hat"
on the fourth, fifth, or sixth limitations. In addition to the limitations inherent
in RICO's plain language, which will prevent its application in unintended
circumstances, such as in garden-variety fraud cases, support may be found
outside of the statute. As noted previously, the legislative history indicates
that RICO and its treble damage remedy were intended to attack the economic
power base of organized crime.3 Therefore, RICO should not be applicable
to ordinary businessmen charged with garden-variety fraud whose only alleged
violation is from the predicate acts and not by reason of a section 1962
violation.
Furthermore, even though fraud in the sale of securities is expressly
enumerated as a racketeering act in section 1961,236 it is questionable whether
that language was ever intended to include garden-variety investment fraud.
The legislative history reveals that Congress expressly considered two instances
to which the phrase "fraud in the sales of securities" may be applicable.
The first instance involves thefts of securities from brokerage houses.237 Pro-
fessor Louis Loss has noted that "[t]he closest reference in the legislative
history is (in the testimony of J. Edgar Hoover) to 'thefts of securities from
brokerage houses,' in a number of which '[cilose associates and relatives
of La Cosa Nostra figures are known to be involved.' "238 The second
instance involves stock manipulation, one of the methods by which organized
crime penetrates legitimate business:
In recent weeks the financial journals have carried stories of current
investigations involving manipulation of listed stocks on a major exchange
231. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 205-15 and accompanying text.
233. See id.
234. See supra note 200.
235. See supra note 130.
236. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(l)(D) (1982).
237. In S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1969) (footnote omitted) it was stated:
It is most disturbing, however, to learn that organized crime has begun to penetrate
securities firms and the Stock Exchange itself. J. Edgar Hoover has testified: "We
have over 30 pending cases (March 1, 1969) involving thefts of securities from
brokerage houses. Close associates and relatives of La Cosa Nostra figures are known
to be involved in at least II of these cases." Apparently, no area is immune.
238. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 800 n.4 (1983).
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by persons with known underworld ties. A simple but effective procedure
was followed. First, an established brokerage house would be penetrated
by the placing of a customer's man with a criminal background. Then,
miraculously, almost overnight, the new man would become a top pro-
ducer and attract "customers" with substantial funds available for invest-
ment. From there, target companies would be selected, then substantial
and carefully controlled purchases of stockholdings negotiated. Then proven
techniques would be utilized to run up the selling price of the affected
stock. False rumors would be circulated as to potential earnings or new
,product developments. Mergers and acquisitions, real or imagined, were
promoted. When stock values soared to desired levels, profit-taking would
occur. Then the helpless management, stockholders, and creditors were
left holding the bag. 2"
It is submitted that Congress intended that RICO, and its treble damage
remedy, be applied to the above-described racketeering activity and not to
garden-variety investment fraud for which there is sufficient remedies
available. A fair and unstrained literal reading of RICO supports this con-
clusion and will narrow RICO's scope to circumstances contemplated by
Congress.
IV. RICO IN COMMODITIEs LITIGATION
In commodities litigation, there has been only a handful of cases in which
RICO allegations have been asserted.24 For the most part, the courts have
analyzed these cases in a manner similar to that used in securities cases where
a civil RICO violation is alleged. One district court's limitation on RICO
has received the express approval of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in its analysis of RICO.24 A second case discusses RICO as it relates
to the CEAct as a result of a unique argument proffered by the defendants.2"2
These two cases, along with other cases involving RICO allegations, will
now be discussed.
239. 113 CONG. REc. 17,998 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Hruska).
240. See Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984); Taylor
v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Vaccariello v. Financial Partners
Brokerage, Ltd., [Current Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,523, at 97,017 (N.D.
II1. July 29, 1983); Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y.
1983); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Glusband v.
Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 487 F.
Supp. 645 (N.D. Il. 1980); Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty, 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D.
I1. 1979).
241. See Parnes v. Heinhold Commodities, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding
that RICO does not contemplate the imposition of liability against an innocent commodities
firm for fraud perpetrated by its agents). Parnes was explicitly approved by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384,
400 (7th Cir. 1984); see infra note 276.
242. See Vaccariello v. Financial Partners Brokerage, Ltd., [Current Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,523, at 97,018-19 (N.D. Ill. July, 29, 1983) (the futures commission
merchants argued that the plaintiff's claims under RICO were pre-empted by § 2 of the Com-
modity Exchange Act, thus necessitating a discussion of the Act).
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A. Judicial Limitations
The first case involving a RICO allegation in commodities litigation is
Heinold Commodities, Inc. v. McCarty.2 "3 In McCarty, the plaintiff, a FCM
registered with the CFTC, filed an action for a declaratory judgment. The
plaintiff sought a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to recover
losses in their commodities trading.2" In response, the defendants filed a
counterclaim alleging, inter alia,2 45 that the FCM's fraudulent actions con-
stituted a RICO violation.2 46 The FCM argued 4 that no civil RICO action
could be maintained absent a criminal conviction of the underlying predicate
acts. 2 ' The court, siding with the majority view, summarily rejected this
argument and found that RICO is not conditioned upon the finding of a
previous conviction. 2 9
The FCM further argued that RICO was not intended to apply to legitimate
businessmen, but rather should apply only to a certain society of criminals,
namely organized crime.2"' The court, again siding with the majority view,
rejected this argument, noting that the statutory language of RICO did not
require an affiliation with organized crime. In addition, the court noted that
the legislative history indicated that Congress did not intend for RICO to
apply solely to organized crime members.25 ' Accordingly, the plaintiff's
motion for a declaratory judgment was denied and the defendants' RICO
counterclaim was allowed to stand. 2 2
The practical effect of rulings such as McCarty, which allow RICO claims
to stand, is the possibility that a defendant, an otherwise legitimate and
243. 513 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
244. Id. at 312.
245. The defendants also alleged that Heinold's fraudulent actions constituted a violation
of the CEAct and a violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act. Id.
246. Id.
247. Heinhold also attacked the counterclaim on the grounds "that it is without merit, and
that it is scandalous, impertinent, and indecent." Heinold argued that the RICO count should
be stricken because it essentially accuses them of being criminals and thus damages their reputa-
tion. In rejecting Heinolds' argument, the court stated:
If the counterclaim states a claim under this statute, it is not scandalous or immaterial
to accuse the plaintiffs of violating it. Moreover, a civil suit alleging a violation
of a criminal statute does not necessarily imply that the alleged violators could
be convicted as criminals. The motion to strike is improper unless the counterclaim
has no substantive merit.
Id. at 313.
248. Id. at 313-14; see also Glusband v. Benjamin, 530 F. Supp. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). The
plaintiff, as receiver of Pyne Commodities Corp., brought suit against former persons associated
with that organization alleging RICO violations. The defendant's argument that convictions
of the predicate acts were necessary in maintaining a civil RICO action was rejected by the
court. Id. at 240-41.
249. 513 F. Supp. at 313-14.
250. Id. at 313.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 314.
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regulated business commodities firm, could be characterized as a "racketeer."
The obvious injustice of this characterization cannot be justified in garden-
variety investment fraud allegations of brokerage house wrongdoing.2 5 As
noted earlier,254 in a garden-variety investment fraud case, there are, in reality,
two victims: the aggrieved customer and the brokerage house which is the
victim of an ongoing infraction by an employee. Furthermore, the require-
ment that publicly held corporations, such as brokerage houses, disclose such
a finding of liability to its shareholders, coupled with the stigma attached
to one labeled a racketeer, can have a detrimental effect upon the corpora-
tion's business. This is not to say that a legitimate business, which knowingly
involves itself in prohibited activity, should not answer for its action where
it violates section 1962. RICO, however, was not intended to apply to
legitimate businesses which are victimized by the fraud of their agents. This
proposition is supported by the second of two opinions in the same case
litigated in the district courts of northern Illinois.
In Parnes v. Heinold, Inc. (Parnes I),255 a RICO count withstood the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted." 6 Parnes alleged that the defendant-FCM's agents perpetrated
a scheme to defraud.2" ' More particularly, two members of the FCM's sales
force successfully solicited the plaintiff's futures trading account. Three
months later, acting on the advice and insistence of the brokers "that
investing more money would bring greater profits, the plaintiff opened
another account." 2 8 Throughout the trading period the brokers made
numerous fraudulent misstatements to the plaintiff.259 In addition, the brokers
engaged in unauthorized trading and misrepresented to the plaintiff the extent
of his losses and the current positions held in each account.26 In essence,
253. For the McCarty court's comments to the contrary, see supra note 247.
254. See supra note 206.
255. 487 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Il. 1980).
256. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
257. 487 F. Supp. at 645-46.
258. Parnes v. Heinold, Inc., 548 F. Supp. 20, 21 (N.D. Ill. 1982). The facts of the Parnes
cases are more fully set out in Parnes II. For clarity, the second opinion is cited here and
in following footnotes.
259. These misrepresentations included statements that:
(1) Trading for the accounts was part of a prudent commodities investment policy
suitable for plaintiffs' investment objectives.
(2) Heinold's trading methods were consistent with plaintiffs' prudent investment
goals and were in plaintiffs' best interest.
(3) Keever and Costello [the brokers] had great expertise in commodities trading.
(4) Keever and Costello would watch closely over plaintiffs' accounts. Because of
such supervision plaintiffs suffered little or no risk of loss.
(5) No unauthorized trading would take place in either account. Parnes would be
consulted before each transaction.
Id. at 21-22.
260. Id. at 22. One of the brokers wrote Parnes a letter promising to stop the prior course
of conduct. Despite the broker's promise, however, unauthorized and fraudulent trading in
the second account continued. (A second account was set up in another person's name, so
1984]
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the plaintiff's allegations arguably amounted to nothing more than garden-
variety civil fraud claims.
In support of the 12(b)(6) motion, the FCM argued that, because a viola-
tion meant a criminal conviction, no violation of section 1962(c) had
occurred. 2 6' The court rejected this argument and held that RICO "does
not condition any civil cause of action upon previous conviction under the
criminal penalties section of the statute. 2 62 Thus, the court found that a
viable claim for relief had been stated. 26 3
Two years later, however, in Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc. (Parnes
I),264 the court granted the FCM's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
thereby dismissing the RICO allegation.2 65 In Parnes II, the court began its
analysis by recognizing the unique problems faced by Congress in enacting
a statute designed to combat organized crime. These problems led to an
expansive definition of racketeering activity, thus causing RICO to sweep
more broadly than originally intended.2 66 The court expressed concern that
many litigants found the prospect of treble damages and federal jurisdiction
very inviting for garden-variety fraud claims.2 67 In essence, the court was
concerned with the misapplication of civil RICO. The court felt that the
use of RICO in a garden-variety commodities civil fraud claim was "a clearly
unintended result reached in a clearly unintended way."266 The court stated
that,
where plaintiffs must founder is in their effort to make the quantum leap
from those prima facie conclusions to Section 1964 coverage. They have
tried to reshape a conventional (alleged) fraud, perpetrated by lower-level
corporate executives acting without corporate sanction (albeit conducting
themselves within the scope of their authority for common-law purposes),
into a Section 1962(c) RICO violation by the corporation. "9
the confirmations of the trades were not sent to Parnes.) As a result of the broker's activity,
the plaintiffs suffered losses of over $35,000. Id.
261. Parnes 1, 487 F. Supp. at 646-47.
262. Id. at 647.
263. Id.
264. 548 F. Supp. 20 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
265. Id. at 24. The court noted that the questions posed in Parries I (i.e., whether a nexus
with organized crime and convictions of the underlying predicate acts need be shown) were
different than the questions considered in Parnes II. Interestingly, the court also noted that
its analysis "owe[d] nothing to the litigants themselves." Id. at 24 n.10.
266. Id. at 23; see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
267. 548 F. Supp. at 23.
268. Id. More specifically, the court also stated:
[Oln the civil side the judicial responses have often reflected an uneasiness with
RICO's possible swallowing up of all common law fraud, a clearly unintended result
reached in a clearly unintended way that has led to such narrowing opinions as
(to take only this District Court as an example) Salisbury v. Chapman, 527 F. Supp.
577, 579-80 (N.D. Ill. 1981); North Barrington Development, Inc. v. Fanslow, No.
80C2644, slip op. at 6-8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 9, 1980); Katzen v. Continental Illinois
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., No. 80C1378, slip op. at 9-10 (N.D. 111. Aug. 14, 1980)
548 F. Supp. at 23.
269. 548 F. Supp. at 23 (emphasis in original).
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The court went on to hold that in order to invoke RICO's treble damages
provision, a suit for a section 1962 violation must be asserted against the
violator-the person who engaged in the unlawful conduct.270 In this instance,
the plaintiff should have brought suit against the brokers who were the
wrongdoers and not the brokerage house.27' "It would be an obvious distor-
tion to permit suit against the 'enterprise' that had itself been infiltrated
by the 'unlawful' conduct or participation of the 'person'-the 'enterprise'
that may itself be a victim of the racketeering activity. 272
The court also considered a strained reverse construction of RICO in which
the FCM would be characterized as the person-thus suable under section
1964-and the two brokers characterized as the enterprise.2 73 The court
rejected that possible construction as it "would turn the English language
on its head. '27  The court postulated that,
[elven were that possible[,] Heinold [sic] would also have to be considered
as having engaged in the "pattern of racketeering activity" by virtue of
having ascribed to it [sic] the mail fraud perpetrated by [the two brokers].
That sort of respondeat superior application, perhaps permissible to establish
ordinary civil liability, would be bizarre indeed as a means to warp the
facts alleged in this case into the RICO mold. Under that theory malefac-
tors at a low corporate level could thrust treble damage liability on a wholly
unwitting corporate management and shareholders.2 '
The holding of Paries H was subsequently adopted by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in a non-commodities case. 76
The Paries scenario serves as an example of the type of garden-variety
commodity civil fraud cases in which plaintiffs often attempt to take
advantage of RICO in order to obtain treble damages. It is in precisely this
type of situation, however, that RICO claims should not be allowed to stand.
270. Id.
271. The court stated:
Under the allegations of the Complaint the normal reading of the RICO sections
would characterize brokers Keever and Costello, the two active wrongdoers, as the
"persons" engaged in the conduct of Heinold's affairs through the brokers' "pat-
tern of racketeering activity." Heinold would normally be viewed as the "enter-
prise" by whom the "persons" were employed. That normal reading however gives
plaintiffs no comfort, for they have sued not the alleged RICO violators-'"per-
sons" Keever and Costello-but "enterprise" Heinold. Plaintiffs have not brought
them'selves within RICO's coverage under the normal application of the statutory
definitions and terms.
Id. at 24.
272. Id. at 23-24; see supra note 206.
273. 548 F. Supp. at 24; see supra note 215.
274. 548 F. Supp. at 24; see supra note 215.
275. 548 F. Supp. at 24 n.9 (emphasis in original).
276. In Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984),
the court of appeals expressly agreed with the Parnes decision. The Haroco court stated
that the Paries court was "surely correct in saying that the corporation-enterprise should not
be liable when the corporation is itself a victim or target, or merely the passive instrument
for the wrongdoing of others." Id. at 401.
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In the Parmes cases, the FCM involved was and still is a legitimate, nation-
wide firm which employs hundreds of individuals. The mere fortuitous cir-
cumstance that two brokers, for personal gain and without corporate sanc-
tion, would churn an account, should not, in and of itself, subject the FCM
to RICO liability.2 "
Additionally, when considering the purpose behind RICO's enactment, it
is even more absurd to allow a RICO claim to stand in such a garden-variety
fraud case. RICO is intended to protect legitimate businesses from organized
criminal activity. This was stated in the Senate report accompanying the RICO
Act.278 RICO was not intended to combat mere garden-variety fraud, for
which there are specific remedies, such as the CEAct's express private right
of action.279 It would be anomalous indeed to punish the very party/victim280
sought to be protected.
The foregoing discussion is not intended to imply that a brokerage firm
will never be liable for RICO's treble damages. RICO allegations may be
properly asserted against so-called "boiler-room" operations28 ' and legitimate
brokerage houses knowingly involved in fraudulent activity. Moreover, in
cases such as Parnes, the FCM will always be liable for actual damages.
In 1983, a RICO allegation was asserted in Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCom-
modity Services, Inc.,282 a case involving the market manipulation of silver
277. In Parnes, the pattern of racketeering activity was conducted by the broker, not the
brokerage house. By allowing the RICO count to stand in such a situation, plaintiffs would,
in effect, "reshape a conventional (alleged) fraud, perpetrated by lower-level corporate executives
acting without corporate sanction (albeit conducting themselves with the scope of their authority
for common-law purposes), into a Section 1962(c) violation by the corporation." Parnes II,
548 F. Supp. at 23 (emphasis in original).
Like the court in Parnes I, the district court in Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynold, Inc., 591
F. Supp. 581 (N.D. Cal. 1984), recently arrived at a similar conclusion. The Lopez court dismissed
RICO counts against Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. The court held that a RICO violation could
only be perpetrated by a criminal organization, and that "Dean Witter could not be that enter-
prise because it is not organized solely for criminal purposes." Id. at 589.
278. See ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL ACT OF 1969, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE
JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969), which stated that the Act "has
as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate
organizations operating in interstate commerce."
279. For remedies involving garden-variety commodities fraud, see 7 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
For remedies involving garden-variety securities fraud, see supra note 133 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 272.
281. In SEC v. R.J. Allen & Assocs., Inc., 386 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Fla. 1974), the court wrote:
"Boiler room" activity consists essentially of offering to customers securities of
certain issuers in large volume by means of an intensive selling campaign through
numerous salesman by telephone or direct mail, without regard to the suitability
to the needs of the customer, in such a manner as to induce a hasty decision to
buy the security being offered without disclosure of the material facts about the issuer.
Id. at 874. For an in-depth discussion of a "boiler room" operation in the commodities field,
see CFTC v. Crown Colony Commodity Operations, Ltd., 434 F. Supp. 911, 915-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
282. 558 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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futures.283 Minpeco alleged that certain defendants (trading defendants)284
conspired to monopolize the silver market, and in doing so, artificially
boosted the price of silver. 2" Minpeco contended that because of the con-
spiracy to monopolize, the price of silver did not drop, as it otherwise would
have done. The market continued to rise, resulting in Minpeco having to
cover its short28 6 positions at a loss of over $80 million.28 7 In addition,
Minpeco contended that it believed that the trading defendants were buying
as individuals and not as members of an organized group.288
Minpeco also named its brokers 89 as defendants. Minpeco alleged that
"its brokers deceived it by urging it to 'sell short' while knowing that such
a trading plan was 'misleading and detrimental' to it.''" 90 Minpeco further
alleged that "the trading plan was 'misleading and detrimental' to Minpeco,
which the brokers knew, since they had been 'participating in the transac-
tions and activities . . . with the intent and effect of raising the price of
silver.. .....
In a somewhat surprising decision, 22 the court dismissed the RICO count
283. The manipulation of the silver market was alleged to have occurred between the sum-
mer of 1979 and early 1980 when the price of silver futures rose dramatically from approx-
imately $9 an ounce to $50 an ounce. Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 552
F. Supp. 332, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The facts are laid out in this previous opinion and thus
cited to hereinafter.
284. These defendants were characterized by the court as the "trading defendants" and
included: ContiCommodity Services, Inc.; ContiCapitol Ltd.; Norton Waltuch; Nelson Bunker
Hunt; Lamar Hunt; William Herbert Hunt; International Metals Investment Co., Inc.; Sheik
Mohammed Aboud AI-Amoudi; Sheik Ali Bin Mussalem; Naji Robert Nahas; Gilian Financial;
ACLI International Commodity Services, Inc.; Banque Populaire Suisse; Advicorp Advisory
and Financial Corporation, S.A.; Mahmoud Fustak; Faisal Bin Abdullah; and Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc. Id. at 335 n.2.
285. Id. at 334.
286. The court stated that:
A short sale is an agreement by someone who does not own-i.e. is short-a com-
modity to sell it at a certain time and a specified price. Such a contract is normally
entered into by a trader who anticipates that the market price will be below the
contract price at the time specified for closing the sale.
Id. at 334-35; see supra note 22.
287. 552 F. Supp. at 335.
288. Id.
289. Minpeco alleged that in early 1979, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (Merrill
Lynch) and E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc. (Hutton) began to solicit Minpeco to engage them as
its brokers. After having allegedly induced Minpeco into retaining them, the brokers were alleged
to have induced Minpeco to adopt a trading plan of engaging in large volumes of short sales
in silver futures. Id. at 339.
Minpeco also named the commodity exchanges as defendants charging them with violating
their statutory and common law duties to prevent market manipulation. Id. at 334.
290. Id. at 339.
291. Id.
292. The decision was surprising in the sense that an overwhelming number of courts held,
at that time, that no link between the defendent and organized crime need be alleged. See
supra note 155. On the other hand, the decision was not surprising because at that time, in
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on the ground that the plaintiff failed to allege "a link between the defen-
dants and organized crime." '293 The Minpeco decision, however, has effec-
tively been overruled by the court of appeals in Moss v. Morgan Stanley,
Inc.29" In light of our previous discussions,"' such manipulations are an
example of the type of situation in which RICO claims should be allowed
to stand.
2 96
In a market manipulation case, there is an organized concerted effort on
the part of the manipulators to "corner the market." Without question,
the manipulators themselves should be individually liable for a RICO viola-
tion. If such trades made during the manipulations are placed by a broker
or brokerage house, an argument may be made that the broker and house
knew or should have known that a manipulation or other violative activity
was taking place. If this can be proven, liability under RICO is proper. This
reasoning is consistent with the Parnes II decision. 97 If, however, a FCM
is an unwitting participant in a manipulatory scheme, the RICO claims should
not be allowed to stand.
B. Statutory Limitations
Vaccariello v. Financial Partners Brokerage, Ltd.2 98 addressed a RICO claim
against an individual and three legitimate commodity firms. The Vaccariello
decision is especially interesting because to date it is the sole case which
discusses the interplay of RICO and the CEAct. Although the unique argu-
ment offered by the three commodity firms was rejected by the court, their
argument may have renewed life due to the subsequent amendment of the
CEAct by Congress.2 99
the Southern District of New York, there were decisions requiring a nexus with organized crime.
See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). On appeal, although
affirming the district court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
the requirement of showing an affiliation with organized crime in RICO cases. See Moss v.
Morgan Stanley, 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983). But see Sedima S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741
F.2d 482, 495-96 (2d. Cir. 1984) (RICO plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury was a result
of "systematic" harm threatened by an "infiltrated" or "illegitimate" enterprise); Bankers Trust
Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d. Cir. 1984) (RICO plaintiff must demonstrate a "pat-
tern" of illegal activity).
293. 558 F. Supp. at 1351. But see Minpeco, S.A. v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., [1982-84
Transfer Binder] COMM. FUT. L. REP. (CCH) 22,063 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 1984) (court agrees
to reconsider the previously dismissed RICO allegations).
294. 719 F.2d at 21; see supra note 155.
295. See supra note 206 and following text.
296. Again, however, the issue we seek to clarify concerns what parties such claims may
be properly asserted against. Resolution of this question is somewhat more complicated that
the resolution of the earlier issues.
297. See supra notes 264-82 and accompanying text.
298. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 99,523, at 97,017 (N.D. II1. July
29, 1983). It is important to note that although Vaccariello was decided in 1983, the case was
filed in 1982. Thus, the court in deciding the pre-emption issue did not consider the argument
in light of the private cause of action which became available to litigants who filed their claims
in 1983.
299. As previously noted, the CEAct was amended to allow for an express private cause
of action. See supra notes 103-25 and accompanying text.
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The mastermind behind the commodities fraud scheme in Vaccariello was
alleged to be Robert Serhant, who allegedly perpetrated the fraudulent scheme
through his companies, Financial Partners, Ltd. and Financial Partners
Brokerage, Ltd. (collectively referred to as FPB).300 The plaintiffs deposited
money with Serhant and FPB to be invested pursuant to an agreed upon
investment program.30 ' The plaintiffs alleged that the money deposited by
them was used by Serhant, FPB, and their agents for speculative trading
in the commodities futures market and was not invested in the agreed upon
investment programs. It was further alleged that Serhant and FPB engaged
in the trading through the facilities and personnel of three commodities
brokerage firms.302 The plaintiffs contended that the brokerage firms "knew
or should have known of the violative practices30 engaged in by Serhant
and FPB who were acting as their agents." 3 ' In addition, it was alleged
that the brokerage firms "aided and abetted Serhant and FPB in their
fraudulent scheme by failing to supervise them or failing to require com-
pliance with the various relevant rules and regulations.
3 03
The defendant brokerage firms, in support of their motions to dismiss,
30 6
argued that RICO was pre-empted by section 2 of the CEAct.3 0 7 Section
2 provides that the CFTC "shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
300. [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 99,523, at 97,017.
301. Id. There were three types of investment programs in which the monies were to be
invested:
(1) [A] "Hedge Account" in which approximately 95% of Investor funds were used
to purchase United States Treasury Bills (T-Bills) and the remaining 5% was used
for futures trading; (2) a "T-Bill Account" in which all the investor funds were
used to purchase T-Bills; and (3) a "Trading Account" in which all of the investor
funds were used for commodities futures trading.
Id.
302. All three brokerage firms were registered with the CFTC as futures commission mer-
chants. Id.
303. The plaintiffs alleged that the CEAct, the CFTC regulations and the Chicago Mercan-
tile Exchange (the exchange on which the trades were made) rules were violated by Serhant,
FPB, and its agents in their scheme to defraud the plaintiffs. Id. at 97,018.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. The defendants sought to dismiss all five counts alleged in the complaint. The court
noted that:
Count I allege[d] violations of the Commodity Exchange Act; Count II [was] under
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 18 U.S.C. § 1961,
et seq.; Count Ill [arose] under the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Prac-
tices Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1211/2 § 261 et seq., Count IV allege[d] common
law fraud, and count V is for breach of fiduciary duty.
[Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. 99,523, at 97,017.
307. The brokerage firms proffered two additional arguments in support of their motion
to dismiss. They first argued that the complaints were defective for failure to plead fraud with
particularity as required by rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The brokerage
firms contended that the plaintiffs needed to specify the participation of each individual defen-
dant as well a the time, place, and manner of the alleged misrepresentations. The court found
that such a requirement "would go well beyond the requirements of Rule 9 and would be
contrary to the spirit of the rules." Id. at 97,018.
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accounts, agreements, . . . and transactions involving contracts of sale of
a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a contract market."3 8
The court, in a very cursory fashion, concluded that RICO did not infringe
upon the CFTC's exclusive regulatory authority and therefore was not pre-
empted by the CEAct.3 °9 The court found that the plaintiffs invoked RICO
as a general anti-fraud provision. Thus, the claims raised under RICO went
beyond the alleged violations of the CEAct to the allegedly fraudulent
activities of Serhant, FP13, and their agents in soliciting and retaining
customers."'
The Vaccariello court's holding is sound in light of the defendant's pre-
emption argument concerning the CFTC's exclusive authority. Given the 1982
amendments to the CEAct and a reformulation of the argument, however,
defendants who are faced with allegations of RICO claims relating to viola-
tions of the commodities law may have a stronger argument in their attempt
to avoid liability.
Cases decided prior to the enactment of the private cause of action under
the CEAct uniformly rejected the pre-emption argument.3 ' The courts
reasoned that because repeal by implication is not favored "in the eyes of
the law," there must be a finding that a later enacted statute "is clearly
intended to be in substitution for the earlier act" 3 2 in order for there to
be pre-emption or implicit repeal. 3 3 To determine legislative intent, a two-
step analysis is employed. Initially, a court must examine the legislative history
of the later act to see whether Congress expressed an intent to repeal, "at
least in part," 3 ' the earlier act. The second step of the analysis involves
a determination of whether there is a "repugnancy in the subject matter
of the two statutes.'' 31
In our opinion, with the advent of the private cause of action, defen-
dants, at least in theory will not be successful in arguing that section 22
The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted. The court, guided by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Conley v.
Gibson which held that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief," found that the plaintiffs had alleged facts sufficient to
support the claims for relief. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 97,019.
310. Id.
311. See, e.g., United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 919
(1980); Vaccariello v. Financial Partners Brokerage, Ltd., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 99, 523, at 97,017 (N.D. I11. July 29, 1983); United States v. McKinnon
Bridge Co., 514 F. Supp. 546 (M.D. Tenn. 1981); United States v. Abrahams, 493 F. Supp.
296 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
312. See United States v. Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. 296, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
313. See, supra note 303.
314. United States v. McKinnon Biidge Co., 514 F. Supp. 546, 550 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).
315. United States v. Abrahams, 493 F. Supp. 296, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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of the CEAct pre-empts RICO. Application of the first prong of the pre-
emption analysis is difficult given section 22's sparce, almost nonexistent,
legislative history. The second step of the test also poses a difficult hurdle
for defendants to overcome in light of the theoretical subject matter of the
two statutes. RICO is primarily designed as an offensive weapon to be utilized
in attacking the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business. 316
The CEAct, on the other hand, seeks to protect investors and traders in
the commodities markets. Thus, arguably there is no "repugnancy in the
subject matter of the two statutes."
In reality, the way in which RICO is applied in garden-variety investment
fraud cases is repugnant to the subject matter of the CEAct. The repugnancy
lies in the fact that the CEAct expressly forbids such violative activity. Courts
must realistically examine RICO as to its designed purpose: to prevent the
infiltration of organized criminal activity into legitimate business. Plaintiffs
who invoke RICO in the garden-variety commodities fraud cases do so
primarily in an attempt to circumvent the damage provisions of the CEAct
which only provides for actual damages" 7 so as to benefit from RICO's
treble damages provision. The basis of their complaints, however, stems from
violations of the CEAct. In such situations, section 22 is expressly designated
the exclusive remedy. 3 8 This congressional mandate insures the achievement
of a goal of all legislation-a uniform application of the law." 9 Accomplish-
ment of this goal necessarily involves the limitation of available remedies
and the development of a uniform body of decisional law regarding the
CEAct. Permitting plaintiffs to sue under RICO, essentially for violations
of the CEAct, in no way fosters this goal.
Moreover, judicial sanctioning of this continued misapplication of RICO
bears out important shortcomings in the statute. The very fact that RICO
has been utilized, with frighteningly increased frequency, in cases totally
unrelated to its purposes and intent, evidences serious deficiencies in the
means sought to implement congressional ends.
Applying RICO in garden-variety fraud cases is also repugnant to the policy
behind an award of punitive damages. A finding of liability under RICO
carries with it an award of treble damages and attorney's fees.2 Treble
damages are, in effect, an award of punitive damages. However, punitive
damages are recoverable only in cases where it is proven that a defendant
has acted willfully, maliciously, or fraudulently.32" ' It is tenuous, at best,
to argue that under a Parnes scenario the FCM acted either willfully,
maliciously, or fraudulently. There, the brokerage firm was as much a vic-
tim of its brokers' wrongdoing as were the plaintiffs.
316. See supra note 239 and accompanying text.
317. See infra note 322 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
319. See Private Rights of Action, supra note 4, at 99.
320. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982).
321. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, it is well settled that punitive damages are not recoverable
for violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the SEC Act.2 2 Arguably,
punitive damages should not be available under the CEAct. Further support
for this contention is found within the CEAct itself. Section 22, which
authorizes the private cause of action, states that only actual damages are
recoverable by aggrieved market participants for violations of the CEAct 2 3
If Congress had intended to permit an award of punitive damages, it would
not have limited recoveries to actual damages. This statement must be read
in light of the fact that Congress was aware of the decisions concerning
punitive damages under the SEC Act, 2 ' and the general societal interest
against such awards. By enacting section 22 of the CEAct, Congress has
carved out specific civil damage remedies available to the futures investor,
and has impliedly rejected treble or punitive damages as a necessary or
desirable remedy.
CONCLUSION
Commodities fraud litigation is an ever expanding area of the law. RICO
counts in commodities litigation are frequently asserted against brokerage
firms, and seek treble damages for the fraudulent acts of the firms' agents.
However, actions which seek damages against a commodities house should
be governed exclusively by the remedies provided in section 22 of the CEAct,
where the FCM was not knowingly involved itself in the fraudulent activity.
RICO counts should not be allowed to stand against a brokerage firm
who is itself the victim of its agents' fraudulent conduct. In such instances,
a brokerage firm should not be subject to the stigma of being labeled a
"racketeer," since this term unfairly denigrates the firm's position in the
commodities markets. Unless the brokerage firm is itself engaged in racketeer-
ing schemes, RICO should not be applicable.
Allowing civil racketeering counts to stand against an innocent brokerage
firm also disregards section 22's mandate that it is the exclusive remedy for
violations of the CEAct. Congress, in enacting section 22, attempted to ensure
a uniform body of law in the commodities area. This goal is subverted
through the application of RICO to a brokerage firm victimized by the
fraudulent acts of its agents. It is only where a violation of the CEAct also
encompasses the component racketeering activities as contemplated by RICO,
that both federal statutes may provide private remedies for violative con-
duct which jeopardizes the integrity of the futures market.
322. See, e.g., Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1974); Globus v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Burkhart v. Alison Realty
Trust, 363 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. III. 1973).
323. See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1), 25(b)(l) (1982).
324. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 353 (1982); California
v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 296 n.7 (1981); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677,
696-99 (1979).
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